

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



**IMPACT OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION ON US NATIONAL
POLICY:
A STUDY OF MEDIA INFLUENCE IN MILITARY AND
GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING**

by

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September 2002

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE September 2002	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Impact of Public Perception on US National Policy: a Study of Media Influence in Military and Government Decision Making		5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR Theresa Bly		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.		
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	

13. ABSTRACT

The American public relies on the mass media to keep them apprised of important events and developments at home and abroad. Often, media stories are the only source of information the public has on a subject, and thus are the basis of opinions and views on issues and world events. Through story selection and reporting practices the media has great influence over public opinion, which in turn drives government policy in some areas.

This thesis will explore the effects of media influence on government decision making through changes in public opinion using the US intervention in Somalia as a case study. A review of newspaper articles and opinion polls covering the life of the mission will provide the data for analysis of this phenomenon.

It is vital that the military understand how media methods drive public opinion so that these methods can be used to a strategic advantage so that the US national policy is not adversely affected by isolated trigger incidents, such as the Blackhawk Down incident of 03 October 1993. The impact of such events can be minimized by using these media methods to properly prepare the public for eventual mission outcomes in advance.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Blackhawk Down, Decision Making, Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Operations Media Influence, Public Opinion, Operation Restore Hope, Somalia, UNITAF, UNOSOM		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 161	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

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A STUDY OF MEDIA INFLUENCE IN MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT
DECISION MAKING**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS

from the

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisors for the inspiration, the ISO Program professors for the knowledge, the Code 32 Staff for keeping me on track, the SWO Scholar Program for the opportunity and finally “The Ensigns” from NPS Class of June ’02 for sticking together and making it through the program in just 12 months.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effects of media influence on United States (US) foreign policy. Particularly, how the perceived level of US military involvement in Somalia differed from the actual level of involvement and how a trigger incident¹ such as the downing of a US Army Blackhawk helicopter in October of 1993 affected decisions leading to the withdrawal of US forces from that country.

B. AREA OF RESEARCH

After the downing of US Army Blackhawk helicopters in Somalia on 03 October 1993 there was a radical shift in US policy resulting in the withdrawal of military forces from the region. The primary focus of this research is to describe the influence on government and military decision making that the media has due to its ability to affect public opinion. Operation Restore Hope was the US portion of the United Nations (UN) intervention in Somalia and lasted from December 1992 until May 1993. This operation and events occurring up until the final US withdrawal in March 1994 will serve as a case study to show that a conflict between public perception of national policies and actual policies can have catastrophic implications for these intended policies. The improper preparation of public opinion by US policy makers through the media renders national policies vulnerable to attack through intentional or inadvertent trigger events. The unexpected loss of life during the Blackhawk Down incident served as a trigger to a negative backlash from the public that drove the US to withdraw.

¹ A trigger incident is a significant occurrence that sets off a chain of events. An example would be the sinking of the Lusitania in 1917 propelling the United States into World War I against Germany; there were other influences on the US to join the Allies, but this event acted as the trigger. Likewise, momentum had been building for a change in US policy in Somalia during the summer of 1993, and the incident on 03 October was the final push that triggered that change and heralded the US withdrawal.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Primary Research Question

How are government actions driven by public opinion resulting from media influences?

2. Subsidiary Research Questions

- a) How do the media shape public opinion?
- b) What is the timeline of US involvement in Somalia, in terms of both policies put forth and actions taken?
- c) How do the media stories from the involvement period describe US actions?
- d) How does public opinion of the operation change with time following the media coverage of specific events?
- e) How do changes in government policy track with changes in public opinion?
- f) How could the public have been better prepared for the turn in events?

D. SCOPE OF THESIS

This thesis is applicable to military and government decision makers as a learning tool to help them understand the scope of media influences on public opinion. As public opinion is an important driving force in determining the direction and effectiveness of US policies, it is vital that decision makers at all levels are aware of how public perceptions are shaped by the media. It may be possible for decision makers to extract from this research a strategy for using the media to drive public opinion in a direction that is advantageous to national interests. The focus of discussion centers on how public opinion determined US policies in response to the Blackhawk Down incident that occurred during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

E. METHODOLOGY

To provide a basis for understanding the effects that the media has on public opinion, this paper first presents a discussion on media operations and how news is perceived and evaluated by viewers and readers. This information embodies the basis for analyzing the Somalia case, and is acquired through a literature review of studies on both media and influence. An examination of historical documents and text sets the timeline for US involvement in-country and defines temporal boundaries for a data search on corresponding news articles and opinion polls. The resulting collection of articles and polls is then set against the historical timeline and analyzed for trends and cause-and-effect relationships to demonstrate how the media influence US policy through manipulation of public opinion.

F. ORGANIZATION

Chapter II provides background material to give the reader a basic understanding of how the media influence public opinion, including story choice and presentation methods for both television and print media, and the methods by which the public chooses and processes the news to which they are exposed. This chapter also describes the effects of media coverage in war and humanitarian situations, which are applicable to the case being studied here. Chapter III introduces the case study and provides historical information on the situation in Somalia and an outline of the policies and actions leading up to and resulting from the Blackhawk Down incident. Chapter IV presents a series of news articles and opinion polls following the timeline of US involvement in Somalia as set out in Chapter III. Chapter IV continues with an analysis of the three data sets (timeline of actions, articles, and opinion polls) to determine the characteristics of any relationship that may exist between them. Chapter V summarizes the conclusions and recommends a strategy for proper handling of the media by government and military decision makers to ensure that public opinion remains in line with national interests.

G. BENEFITS OF STUDY

The US government as a whole must be aware of the power of the media to form public opinion. Particularly, it is vital that the military understand how media methods drive public opinion so that these methods can be used to a strategic advantage so that US national policy is not adversely affected by isolated trigger events. This study will heighten awareness of this phenomenon and hopefully reduce the risk of undesired alterations in national policy.

II. MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION

A. INTRODUCTION

The premise of this paper is that government policies are shaped by public opinion, which is influenced by the actions of the mass media. In a democracy, policy is supposed to be determined by the people, the downside to this in American society is that public perceptions are based on the information they receive from the media, which is biased and incomplete. As a first step in the research, we must first explore the nature of this influence. Specifically, how the media affects public opinion and what mechanisms it uses to achieve this result. The first three sections of this chapter provide background material to help the reader understand how the media operates, how readers and viewers receive and process the news, and how the media influences its audience. The final section of this chapter describes the effects of media coverage on both public opinion and decision-makers in war and humanitarian situations. Analyses presented in subsequent chapters are based on the information presented here.

B. MASS MEDIA OPERATIONS

Due to the structuring of the US media system, the mechanisms by which it works and the growth of concentrated ownership groups, the range of discourse allowed free reign is becoming narrower. It is commonplace for the government line to be repeated without comment, analysis or opposing viewpoints being presented. The trustworthiness of the source namely the anchor, the network, or the publisher causes the audience to accept the story in its given format without questioning the motives that may have been behind its slant. There is also the fact that the majority of the public only exposes themselves to a limited number of news sources (usually one newspaper and one evening news broadcast), which narrows even further the scope of information they will be exposed to and then later have access to when forming their own views of an issue. Beyond that, there are certain characteristics of the news media that further guide the positions and viewpoints taken by their audiences.

1. Organization

A news organization's internal structure combines with market forces to affect when it can lead public opinion. "Certain media outlets—especially newspapers and magazines, but sometimes also television's programs ad networks—do not merely reflect the social and political forces around them, they actively work to shape political discourse to their own purposes.²" News organizations play a major role in disseminating information to the public and because of this, leave an imprint on public opinion. The media elites who determine the content of the news thus have a chance at leading the public and shaping political thought. They make their decisions on which stories will come to press and make the telecast based on many factors such as politics, space and time concerns, and shock value. Market considerations drive some news selection, especially when the news organization depends on advertising revenues, or high ratings in the case of television. Economic concerns and competition with other news sources might induce organizations to anticipate what the public wants to know about in order to attract a larger audience, leading to story selection for the wrong reasons. News is about selling the most papers or having the highest ratings rather than getting the news out to the public and informing them of current events—entertainment rather than education.

The decisions on which stories to publish and air are made by individuals at different levels within the organizational structure of each media operation, namely reporters, editors, and owners. Members of each group have their own set of incentives based on their position within the organization that help them decide which items are newsworthy. In this way, the structure of the organization helps to facilitate collective action in getting a story chosen. For example, if a reporter wants their story featured on the front page or at the tope of a news broadcast, they will frame the story in such a way that it is more likely to be chosen by their superiors. Publishing decisions are also influenced by deadlines; if a story is not finished by press time it will not make the paper. Strict deadlines can have an effect on story content and quality as journalists rush to turn in a finished product.

² Page, Benjamin I. *Who Deliberates?: Mass Media in Modern Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

2. Selecting Stories for Coverage

People with money and power are able to filter the news, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their message across to the public. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman summarize the forces behind this filtering as follows:³

- Size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass media firms
- Advertising as the primary income source of the mass media
- Reliance of the media on information provided by government, business and experts funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power
- “Flak” as a means of disciplining the media
- “Anti-communism” as a national religion and control mechanism

On the subject of advertising, especially in television, there are also pressures to show a continual series of programs that will encourage audience flow (watching from program to program to sustain advertising rates and revenues.) This results from advertisers wanting, in general, to avoid programs with serious complexities and disturbing controversies that may interfere with the buying mood of the consumer. As a programming trend setter, the advertising dollar is responsible for cutbacks in hard-line, objective news reporting, informational, and documentary type programs.

Since sources such as the US government and businesses are often well known, they are deemed reputable and therefore their veracity is not often questioned. When a source is a governmental organization or individual from foreign country, such as Saddam Hussein, the media often frames their positions and comments as propaganda, suggesting that they are untrue. “The elite domination of the media and the marginalization of dissidents that results from the operation of these filters occur so naturally that media news people, frequently operating with complete integrity and goodwill, are able to convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news objectively and on the basis of professional news values. Within the limits of filter constraints they often are objective; the constraints are so powerful, and are built into the

³ Chomsky, Noam and Edward Herman. *Manufacturing Consent*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.

system in such a fundamental way, that alternative bases of news choices are hardly imaginable.⁴ These filters act to define the system and limit what is considered to be acceptable public opinion. By then encouraging debate and consenting views within those boundaries, people are given the impression that there is free thinking going on and objectivity on the part of the media. In actuality the system definitions and boundaries are being reinforced by the limits placed on the debate.

There is no formal censorship in the US, but there is a sort of market censorship. That is, mainstream media do not want to run stories that will offend their advertisers and owners. In this way, the media end up censoring themselves and not reporting on many important issues including, for example, corporate practices. Another effect of these market forces is that mainstream media will focus on what will sell, and news coverage becomes about attracting viewers rather than informing the public. Objective coverage takes a backseat to the economic demands of running a news business. Stories and investigations may not get aired or printed for internal political reasons, rather than reasons that would question journalistic integrity. News and information are subject to partiality and unbalanced coverage and even omissions of major issues. In the absence of self or organizationally imposed censorship, this can be caused outright bias on the part of the reporters or news editors who are responsible first for choosing the news and second for getting it out to the people, or simply by gatekeeping, a part of the story selection process.

Gatekeeping is the process by which a handful of news items are selected for use by the media from the countless possible stories that exist.⁵ The temporal and geographic path from story to news is a channel with gates along the way representing multiple decision and action points where a story will either move on, be discarded, or be transferred to another decision channel. Story rejections are based on judgments of newsworthiness, space concerns and whether the story is original or simply a rehashing or refresher of previous work. Timeliness, cost, and investment value also play roles. Gatekeeping is not limited to the editors and producers that have the final word on the

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁵ Livingston, Steven. “Suffering in Silence: Media Coverage of War and Famine in Sudan.” In Rotberg, Robert I and Thomas G. Weiss. *From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 68.

content of the final product. It begins much further back in the life of a story with the contact point between a reporter and source; if they never meet there is no story and the same results if the reporter decides not to pursue the information given.

Example: Sudan vs. Somalia

Comparing the coverage of war and famine in Sudan with that in Somalia, shows some of the factors in media gatekeeping, many of which have nothing to do with the event itself. Similar conditions existed at the same time in each country, but Somalia became the focus of media attention and from that, humanitarian aid. The major concerns that arise for the US media in deciding whether or not to cover such an event are: the location and nationality of the victims, the foreign policy orientation of the US government, and the accessibility of the affected areas to the press corps. For Sudan and Somalia, the only difference was that coverage by the media was made easier by the logistics of operating in Somalia. With so much to cover with limited time and resources, journalists go in the direction of least resistance.⁶ Keeping this in mind, the decision was made unconsciously for the press team because of the resources available to them in-country. The media had appropriate equipment, transportation, and staff already on the ground in Somalia and the relative sizes of the two countries made the smaller Somalia easier to cover. Legal impediments to press movement and reporting in Sudan, harassment by the military and denial of entry and exit visas made that option even less attractive.

Additionally, there is the drama factor in any story. It is difficult to maintain public interest in a story that drags on year after year, where on the other hand an intense and concentrated crisis will always draw an audience. A trigger event depicting a sharp dramatic change in conditions is needed to bring public attention to a possibly long term or existing situation. The public needs to be satisfied that their interest in the story will be justified. The collapse of Somalia as a nation state was such an event. Because the media were already covering Somalia due to the superior reporting conditions in that nation, public attention was focused there, making it prudent policy-

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 82.

wise for the US to get involved in a more official capacity despite the lack of any vital national interest. Sending in troops in any capacity automatically makes the US public interested, no matter where the event is or the circumstances. It gives them a direct personal link to the crisis, which in turn motivates the press into greater coverage to give the audience what they want. Livingston's study of Washington Post articles showed spikes in Somalia coverage during the period between 1991 and 1994 when the US became more involved and sent troops to the region.⁷

C. PROCESSING THE NEWS

The mass media is the only source of political information for the majority of the public because generally it is too far removed from their personal lives to have a contact that will serve as a primary information source. Beyond the question of how the news is presented by the various media outlets after story selection, is how the public processes the information that is made available.

1. Story Selection by the Audience

The sheer volume of information available through newspapers, television, and lately the Internet makes information overload a real risk for the average American; they have to process the news to cut down on the quantity before trying to make sense of it. They really only pay attention to a small amount of the available information, and then build up an internal database of information with accompanying perceptions and opinions. This is especially true of news stories, which are pre-processed before the audience sees them and shaped to present the meanings that the journalist has assigned. The audience is more likely to simply accept the stories as given rather than forming their own opinions about the contents because that would be too difficult without the background information and evidence used by the journalist to reach the conclusions. Such information is usually not presented with the story due to time and space constraints imposed by newspaper and television news formats, resulting in a preprocessed and usually one-sided story product for the audience to absorb. Subjects preselected by

⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 74-75.

others and impoverished in detail have a decreased chance of being processed carefully by the audience, and news stories are a perfect example.⁸ Due to the low interaction level required by television, this easy-acceptance effect comes more into play for viewers of the evening news rather than newspaper readers. They do not have to consciously watch the broadcast for their minds to pick up information unconsciously and store it for later use. Newspapers, on the other hand, require that the readers be more involved in the news and take a more personal stake in processing the information provided.

To prevent information overload, people need a strategy for excluding news and selecting what they want to know from the vast amount of information presented everyday. To do this, they monitor news sources using a personal criteria set to determine which stories are important and then ignore the rest, normally an automatic process done without conscious thought. In a study on the reading habits of newspaper subscribers, Graber found that 67% of the stories were ignored completely and of the 33% that were noticed, about half were read completely while the rest were just skimmed for pertinent information. The readers were influenced in their story choices by different techniques of media cueing including: use of pictures, headline size, position in the paper, and placement of the article on the page. Half of the articles that drew attention were on the front page, and 70% of those that were read all the way through were in the first section.

Part of the reason for the reader's interest in stories being so focused toward the front of the paper has to do with the paper's organization. Articles which the journalists and editors determine are most important are placed first. The information contained within each article is presented the same way, in a pyramid style, starting with specific and interesting details right below the headline and getting more general as the reader progresses down the column. Interest is also drawn by the amount of press given to a single topic in terms of both space and repetition, the use of eye-catching phrases or keywords in headlines and opening paragraphs, and cues from the social environment that tell them what issues are important enough to garner their attention.

⁸ Graber, Doris A. *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide*. New York: Longman Inc., 1988, p. 8.

Even though people have a set of criteria for selecting stories, they do not use it in a careful or systematic fashion, usually resorting to skimming or scanning the news and waiting for something of interest to jump out at them. It is easy to miss a story that is important or interesting because of the method most people use to read the daily paper. Additionally, reading an article or watching the news on television does not guarantee that the audience will process the information or even be able to recall it at a later date. Most adults see the news as something to keep up with out of habit or obligation or as a way to follow a specific topic, and as such do not give the entire paper or news broadcast their full attention, preferring to concentrate on the important headlines and stories with a personal significance to the individual. In fact, 61% of the stories remembered by the Graber panelists were due to personal relevance, emotional appeal, or societal importance. Some stories are rejected because the presentation is confusing to the audience member or because it conflicts with their preconceived notions of the world.

The public is interested in easy access news, they do not want to have to work hard in order to stay informed, which is difficult to avoid if a story challenges too many of their ideas. Additionally, to combat information overload, the public has a tendency to economize on information processing by focusing on only conclusion reached by the journalist and the general meaning presented by the story. Skimming newspaper articles, the brief story treatment offered by television news, and the lack of serious commitment to studying the news all prevent the public from truly learning from the media. Stories are not structured or presented properly for true learning, but they can serve to present new ideas for consideration that may influence future thoughts and actions.

2. Audience Learning

Selecting a story for attention does not guarantee that the audience will retain the information or adopt the views that are presented. There are other concerns that factor into audience learning. The nature of the message is an important factor in first attracting and then holding audience attention long enough to make an impact and get the point across. Redundancy, length, public interest, ease of access, format and subject matter are all aspects of news stories that can draw attention. The response by various audience members to the media's use of these techniques varies from person to person and by the

motivations that each one has for processing and learning from what is presented. Journalists and other media players will use audience motivations to their advantage in presenting the news.

Like any business, media outlets require customers (in the form of their audience) in order to remain in business. To ensure a stable client base, they treat the evening news as a form of pseudo-entertainment to entice viewers to tune in every night by choosing stories based on their potential to grab attention rather than simple objectivity and the desire to keep the public informed. The viewing public is just as bad, since they have been socially trained from an early age in the recreational use of television; training that causes the evening news to be watched for two categories of items: information that is personally important and information that provides psychological gratification. Besides choosing their news based on entertainment value, people will generally tend to avoid stories that conflict with knowledge, attitudes and feelings that they already possess or that may threaten or disturb them. Conversely, they seek out reassuring information or that which is congruent with their own mindset. People will of course be exposed to information that is undesirable, but exposure is not the same as processing and acceptance. They are generally more receptive when the message is more attractive or has a personal stake for them.

Media agenda setting also plays a role in audience learning. People tend to accept guidance from the media in determining what information is most important and therefore worthy of attention.⁹ Agenda setting uses media cues such as the frequency of coverage and prominent display of important stories to draw attention to certain issues and cause the audience to take them seriously. Most of the time the public is willing to follow the media's lead and adopt the views presented because it is the easiest way to make judgments, especially when the audience does not have the background required to fully process issues like foreign policy decisions. The public is likely, however, to ignore media cues when their minds are already made up on an issue. This will happen when the audience member has a personal stake in the story, considers themself an expert on the subject, or can personally contradict the presented views.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 132.

Story context and audience attitudes are additional factors that contribute to or hinder learning from the media. Cognitive and social skills learned throughout life determine people's responses and actions to different types of information and ways of presenting it. Knowledge gained from the audience's environment and experiences affects how each individual will focus on and process a story. Those with backgrounds appropriate to the story in question will be able to analyze it and think critically about the issue before rendering judgment. Without the necessary background, there is not enough interest generated for critical thought and the audience members will be unable to see the information in the appropriate context and must therefore either accept what the media presents or ignore it.

The audience is more likely to pay attention to and believe the stories presented by the media if the source is credible, regardless of their personal knowledge of the subject. This is especially true if the source is considered an expert or an insider with special knowledge of a situation, such as a politician or a senior military officer discussing foreign policy concerns or actions. Trust in the source increases when the audience has little or no personal knowledge of a topic or situation. By relying on the media as their only source of information for foreign affairs, the public allows itself to adopt the views presented by the trusted experts even though the presentation is usually one sided and incomplete.

Stories presented by the media are subject to pre-processing before they ever reach the public. To meet the time and space demands of newspapers and television broadcasts, details are lost and the stories themselves become more abstract as a single theme or meaning is brought out by the journalist. By choosing what to emphasize, the media frames the news without even knowing it. Focusing on a single issue gives the story a slant leading to an overall meaning and inferences that the audience will draw from the story and retain even after the particulars of the specific story are forgotten. Remembering only the main ideas and themes of a piece helps the public to deal with information overload, but it also makes it more difficult for people to think critically about issues since so many details and background information are lost or never presented. Audience members instead usually look at big picture ideas when watching the news and selecting stories for their personal attention. When a story is selected, it

becomes part of their mindset and may be used to select additional stories in the future. Difficulties arise when the information presented is questionable or unpleasant, resulting in rejection of the story regardless of the subject.

People are reluctant to change their minds, but odds are new information that clashes with previously held notions may cause reassessment and a change of viewpoints if enough new information is presented by a trusted source. This is especially true when the media are the main source of information on a particular subject. In politics and foreign affairs, people rely primarily on culturally provided explanations, which are largely supplied by the media. In other areas with which the public is more personally involved, such as taxes, individual viewpoints are less likely to change due to media effects. Influence of this kind only works when the audience relies on the media for information and recognizes the fact that they themselves do not have the background to make sound critical judgments on a particular subject. “The media make major contributions to schema formation and development by providing the public with partially processed information in various domains of knowledge and by signaling the relative importance of stories. This information is particularly pervasive in those areas where people have few chances to acquire information through personal sources.¹⁰”

The public relies on the media to track events, thus creating a context for future actions and judgments, trusting them to provide a complete picture when that is not possible. Media goals of speed and scooping other outlets are in direct conflict with public use. What results from media organization and format styles is story shortening, simplification, and the use of attention grabbing techniques to draw and retain audience interest.

D. INFLUENCE

Media are closely linked to public opinion and public policy. Media attention to an issue affects decision making because policymakers understand that mass media shapes public opinion and they want public opinion on their side. Because we live in a fast paced world and because of the public’s sometimes limited attention span, the media

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 263.

may cover a story prominently but only for a short period of time. This short lived saturation can dilute the media's impact. Once the media push ends, it has little direct effect on public policy. Media coverage can be most effective when it focuses intensely on an issue over a long time period, but journalists will cover an issue only when there is an angle that makes the story timely and newsworthy. These two qualities often work at cross principles because when a story loses its punch and is shelved, public attention turns away and the issue is forgotten or deemed less important because of the seeming loss of support from the media.

1. Media Effects

The mass media act as a communication tool within the policy community, allowing indirect interaction between groups such as government officials and grassroots organizations that would normally not speak together on a normal basis. The media acts as a conduit allowing influence groups, organizations, and others to communicate with both the public and with decision makers in Washington DC by effectively getting their message out to the media. Second, the press also helps to intensify and accelerate movements that have already begun through other channels. Mass media rarely start a movement, but they can pick up an idea that originated elsewhere and accelerate its development or magnify its impact. Third, public opinion affects policymakers. Many are elected officials or appointed officials who know they need the public on their side in order to stay in office. The media influence and are influenced by public opinion, as they try to give readers and viewers information about issues that they care about. The result is that government officials rely on the media as a means of monitoring the state of public opinion on subjects like which issues the public feels need to be addressed and how well government is doing addressing them. Public opinion is a powerful force that directs government to do something, or more often, constrains government from doing something. An issue that is prominent in the media either influences or reflects public opinion (sometimes both,) and public opinion sways policymakers. Finally, the media's importance varies among players. Insiders, such as administration officials, have easy access to key government decision makers and have less need for media coverage than outsiders. Activists, lobbyists, and others may have little access to officials and must go

to some lengths to gain their attention. While media rarely create news, or directly force issues to the government's agenda, they can be a powerful force in stepping up the battle and encouraging open communication between policy makers, interest groups, and the general public.

Changes in the way issues are presented by the media have been shown to cause dramatic shifts in public preferences. A study by Krosnick and Brannon (1993) used survey data to demonstrate that media refocusing played a large part in President Bush's popularity in 1992.¹¹ The media use their reputations and platform to set agendas among the public and change public attitudes and opinions about news issues. The vast majority of the people are very receptive to the source and therefore the message. It is not that public opinions are manufactured in whole by the media, but they are influenced in subtle and sometimes not so subtle ways.

For various reasons discussed above, reporters see themselves as presenting objective stories when in actuality choices made in the investigative and reporting process causes them to frame the news in certain ways and thus preventing the audience from making a balanced assessment or from getting the whole story. Individuals on both sides of the story may be unaware of the frame. Reporters simply see their way of presenting a story as objective reporting and the public sees news from a respected source and unconsciously makes the judgment that the view presented is the dominant or correct one to hold. In most cases the framing is not intentional, it is caused by organizational policies and structures and the natures of the formats through which the public receives their news and processes it. Journalists are socialized into certain ways of telling stories; they work within a given language and frame out of habit and training unconsciously.¹² The story's construction alters its meaning through emphasis, structure, and point of view, all of which are seen by the reporter as objective journalistic techniques rather than tools of influence.

¹¹ Rhoads, Kelton. "Media Framing," *Working Psychology: Introduction to Influence*. <http://www.workingpsychology.com/mediafr.html>, 26 February 2002.

¹² Bentall, Jonathan. *Disasters, Relief and the Media*. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers & Co. Ltd, 1993, p. 191.

2. Agenda Setting Function of the Press

Editors and journalists are influenced in story choice by organizational concerns, competition, and personal advancement, more so than by political motivations. But the political ramifications of their choices about what is news are huge since policy makers do not usually take notice of issues that are not important to the public. Through agenda setting, the media makes issues important to the public and thus to the policy makers who will then take action. Events that are not given exposure in this fashion are not taken seriously. On the flip side, politicians not taken seriously by networks are not by the public either. Public figures must be careful about how their own actions (or lack thereof) are portrayed by the media for the good of their own reputation and security in office.

The public does not have direct access to candidates or the sources of issues in their everyday lives, so they allow the media to act as their main source for information and also for the context in which that information is to be seen and processed. Exposure to information via the mass media jump-starts a thought process in the viewer or reader that begins with awareness, which is processed into information, then transformed into attitudes, and finally applied as behavior.¹³ The news media, especially editors, set the agenda and determine which issues are important by choosing certain stories to be printed or aired over others, thus creating images of public affairs and having long term effects on the views and priorities of their readers and viewers. This is especially true in areas like politics and foreign affairs where the public at large has little personal or direct contact and the media is the primary or only source of information. The information presented is an edited reality because of the time and space constraints of print and broadcast media as well as the various other concerns that editors and producers must deal with to get the news out.

Public opinion about which issues are important are most often found to be in line with those reported by prominent news organizations. Survey based studies of media agenda setting show a clear relationship between what the news reports and what the public thinks about. Newspapers and television do not necessarily tell the public what to

¹³ McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw. "The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press." In Graber, Doris A. *Media Power in Politics*. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, p. 65.

think, but they do set an agenda of issues, determine their relative importance, and tell the public how to think about them. The media does not tell the people what to think, just what to think about. A study by Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder showed that problems deemed important by the media become so to the public.¹⁴ They reached this conclusion by creating differently arranged news programs, each with an emphasis on one particular issue, and showing them to groups of viewers who were asked to complete pre- and post-viewing questionnaires to record their viewpoints and monitor any changes. An analysis of the subject's responses showed a shift in responses in line with the emphasis of each group's specially themed news program. There was an impact made in the amount of importance that the issues were given in relation to others, showing that network news does have an effect in shaping public opinion via agenda setting. One reason is because the public at large is unable to get out and see all the issues and events for themselves, someone has to present them and the people look to the media to perform this service.

Reliance on television as a learning device by a greater number of Americans is causing the interpretive and interactive skills of the populace through disuse. It is much easier for the general public to accept information as presented and pre-processed by the media than to develop their own agendas and critical views of the issues. Also, it is often the only way to learn about the issues. Constraints on story presentation make it impossible for full stories with complete background information to be told. Only the end product of the reporters interviews, research, and editing is presented to the public; they get the conclusions without seeing any of the evidence or the train of thought that led to them. When there is not enough information to draw your own conclusion, it is simply easier to accept the one that is given. Television viewers are especially susceptible to this phenomenon as speeches are reduced to sound bites and even the lead story is seldom given more than a minute of airtime. Television also requires a much lower level of participation from the audience than does any other form of media, making the reception of information from the evening news almost effortless. With fewer barriers between the information and the audience, the short presentation of stories, and

¹⁴ Iyengar, Shanto, Mark D. Peters and Donald R. Kinder. "Experimental Demonstrations of the 'Not-so-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs." In Gruber, Doris A. *Media Power in Politics*. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, pp. 54-60.

the choice of news to attract viewers (pseudo-entertainment) television broadcasts are perfectly arranged for agenda setting.

Gatekeepers pick the stories and then also decide the length, content, presentation style, and position in the newscast or paper. Audiences then weigh said stories in a similar fashion in their own minds, possibly subconsciously, but when the story is recalled later so will its assigned status. Status-conferral, stereotyping, and image-making all result from the press presenting an object's attributes in certain ways, and the more a press covers a topic stressing these points, the more likely the audience is to absorb and learn the information in the way it is presented. Story placement, frequency and the authority of the reporters and sources gives stories their importance. Opinions that are most often and most prominently covered have the best chance to influence perceptions. Reports placed at the top of news programs are more likely to influence the public agenda than non-lead stories because stories that appear first tend to matter more in the eyes of the public.¹⁵ For the same reason, front page material in the morning paper is also seen as being more important and more likely to be read and remembered.

Example: Presidential Elections

In the first empirical investigation based specifically on agenda setting by the media, McCombs and Shaw polled voters in Chapel Hill, NC during the 1968 presidential election.¹⁶ They found substantial correlations between the issues covered by the media and what undecided voters saw as the key issues. Overall, their views reflected a composite of the press coverage rather than being skewed towards the voter's favorite candidate or self-described political views.

During the 1980 US Presidential election, the media focused mainly on Carter's failures in dealing with the Iranian hostage crisis. Nothing was said directly against him, but the slant of the reports was decidedly negative, enough to shape public opinion against him and undermine his re-election campaign. Viewers primed with news

¹⁵ Nacos, Brigitte L. *Terrorism & the Media: From the Iranian Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma City Bombing*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 25.

¹⁶ McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw. "The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press." In Graber, Doris A. *Media Power in Politics*. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, p. 67.

of the hostage crisis were more likely to judge Carter's performance as president based on those than people who did not see the same stories.¹⁷

3. Effects on Decision-Makers

Not only does agenda setting by the media have an effect on the public's views of the issues, but those of government decision makers as well. The emphasis placed on certain stories may force the president and congress to take actions they would not otherwise have chosen and also influence the timing of such actions. Viewed from the other side, news stories also shape the image of the president and current office holders as seen by the public and other influential actors. The mass media, through news stories, act as communications channels between otherwise unconnected parts of government, constituents, and organizations throughout the country and the world.

Reality as refracted through the lens of the news media is for most people their only glimpse at what is going on at the White House.¹⁸ What the media presents has consequences for both sides, the public and the politicians because news organizations are significant actors in the US political system. They serve to determine public perception of issues, interpret leaders actions, influence elections, and also legitimize or delegitimize people and actions. The White House sees relations with the media as determining reputation and prestige because of the effects stories have on public opinion. Stories about the president and other decision-makers reflect the opinions of influentials in Washington that have the ear of the press. It is easier for reporters to turn to long time sources who they know will consent to interviews than to develop new contacts for every issue; as part of the story choice process both the public figures and the reporters are using each other to their own advantage—to get their message out or further their own careers. Opinions and views on issues thus go from influentials in Washington through the media and direct to the public where they shape and reflect the perception of the President as a leader. The levels of support a leader is receiving affect the way the media

¹⁷ Nacos, Brigitte L. *Terrorism & the Media: From the Iranian Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma City Bombing*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 12.

¹⁸ Grossman, Michael B. and Martha J. Kumar. "The Refracting Lens." In Gruber, Doris A. *Media Power in Politics*. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, p. 197.

cover him, which in turn can force a reaction from the White House or Congress in issues that may not have surface through normal bureaucratic channels.

E. WAR AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATIONS

1. Media and the Military in War

Propaganda comes into play in the media, especially in times of war or other occasions where troops are deployed to the field. The media portrays a negative image of the enemy and reinforces it with rhetoric in support of their own side, leading to a further problem with double standards and hypocrisy than already established by both story choice and placement. Common media tactics include: using selective stories that come across as being wide-covering and objective, presentation of partial facts, and offering judgments and conclusions without including the supporting evidence and chain of reasoning that led to them. What results is a shortcut in the reasoning process that takes away the possibility of critical thought and analysis from the audience and encourages them to accept the judgment as presented, as fact.

The media are not alone in their manipulation of the facts. During time of war (and even during peace) the military operates in a similar fashion by restricting the information presented to the media and hence what the public is told. These different layers of omission, framing, and analysis that occur before stories come to press or are shown on the evening news, cause media coverage of conflicts to degrade in quality and objectiveness. Ottosen identifies the following key stages of a military campaign to soften up public opinion through the media in preparation for an armed intervention.¹⁹ These are:

- The Preliminary Stage – during which the country concerned comes to the news, portrayed as a cause for mounting concern because of poverty, dictatorship or anarchy;
- The Justification Stage – during which big news is produced to lend urgency to the case for armed intervention to bring about a rapid restitution of normality;

¹⁹ *The Peace Journalism Option*. Taplow Court, Buckinghamshire UK, 25-29 August 1997. Text of conference findings available at: <http://www.poiesis.org/pjo/pjotext.html>.

- The Implementation Stage – when pooling and censorship provide control of coverage;
- The Aftermath – during which normality is portrayed as returning to the region, before it once again drops off the news agenda.

The military wants to present stories that will support their campaign, while on the other hand, journalists are supposed to be critical and objective. The mission of the military is to fight and win whatever conflict they are involved in, preferably on the battlefield, but the battle of the story, specifically in public opinion and in history books, is just as vital. The press can often be seen as working at cross purposes with the military by discovering and reporting on stories that do not help the mission objective or do not follow the policies and viewpoints set out by the public affairs office. The military tries to avoid these problems by holding periodic press briefings, training up public affairs officers, and maintaining a friendly relationship with media representatives. This is advantageous in two ways, good relations with the press can prevent the release of stories that are potentially damaging (especially strategically and tactically) and also maintaining contacts within the media ensures that the party line will have a voice.

Military and government decision makers must make use of media relationships to manage the flow of information to the public in order to keep public opinion in line with national objectives. Proper media management, one facet of information warfare, is as critical to the battle as superior strategy against the enemy. Because of this, media organizations are often subject to constraints by the government while covering conflicts, not only for the safety of the troops and civilians in the fighting area but also to keep homefront morale and support for the troops up. In order to properly prepare the public for war, it is sometimes necessary to shelve more objective and balanced reporting in favor of a more one-sided presentation.

Example: Vietnam

During US involvement in Vietnam, press coverage served to further confuse the issues at hand and pave the way for public unrest and anti-war sentiments which made the military's job even more difficult. The media served to magnify the

inconsistencies and brutalities of the war, often going against the information put out by the President. This trend was slow to develop with the press starting out on the pro-war side and then gradually changing as the war turned out to be difficult and victory was not quick as had been predicted. Cameras and reporters in the field with their daily updates from the combat zone captured the brutality of the war and focused on civilian deaths and US losses, serving to stretch the war timeline, making it seem endless to the people at home.

Walter Cronkite, often cited as the most trusted man in America at the time, symbolized the consensus of the people. His views changed when those of the public changed, gradually at first, and then more rapidly as he spoke out against the war, using his prestige and power to convince the American people to join him in his beliefs.²⁰ At the beginning of the war effort, he accepted the official line and used his credibility to amplify it. He gave the benefit of the doubt, as did the rest of the country, to government and military leaders since they knew what they were doing since war was their business. Limited broadcast time, frustrated and alienated field reporters, and the emphasis on bloody footage made the war seem both endless and hopeless. As this continued, the country and Cronkite were effected by this attitude, increasing doubts as to the righteousness of the action.

The real change in reporting was marked by the Tet Offensive of 1968, during which Vietcong troops were caught on film for the first time showing valor, courage and durability, the exact opposite of what US propaganda had been saying about their sneak attacks and cowardly actions. For the first time, the public saw that the US may actually be on the wrong side of the conflict, and that the President and government officials misled them to get involved in the first place and continued to mislead them to stay involved. It changed the way Cronkite and other anchors and reporters viewed the war. No longer were they reluctant to air doubt and pessimism, in fact Cronkite went to Saigon shortly after Tet to see the action for himself. He was shocked to see that the fighting was still going on while the generals were telling him that the battle was over. His conclusion: the men in charge could not be trusted, they had lost their credibility over

²⁰ Halberstam, David. "Televising the Vietnam War." In Gruber, Doris A. *Media Power in Politics*. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984, pp. 290-295.

Tet and it was his job to let the American people know. Disillusioned by what he had seen in the field, Cronkite shed his objectivity and made a thirty minute personal broadcast in which explained why the war was not working and how the US had to start thinking about getting out of Vietnam.²¹

Public consensus had already begun to shift to a more anti-war stance, and this broadcast changed the balance, finally pushing it over the edge and giving the movement a boost. President Johnson respected Cronkite personally and viewed his attitude change as a sign that he had lost the support of average Americans in his continued support of the war. The President recognized the media's role as both a barometer for and influence on public opinion, and realized that once he reached this point there was no salvaging it or turning it back in his favor. In response he announced his intention to not seek re-election and continued with the war he could not win until leaving office. Lessons learned in Vietnam contribute greatly to military handling of the press today.

2. Media and Humanitarian Crises

a. Informing the Public

Media are a very powerful force in American political and social life. They tell people what to think about and how various issues rank in terms of importance simply by the nature and amount of coverage an event receives. This is especially true for events in the third world and for international humanitarian crises where media plays a decisive role in determining both political and popular concern, due to the fact that the mass media are the only source of information in such circumstances. Coverage does not change the importance of an event, only its impact. Media attention, particularly if not sustained, may not be sufficient to generate a response, but it is necessary to inform the world that the event is occurring.²² There can be no response if the actors with the appropriate resources to help are not informed and there is no motivation for them to act.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 294.

²² Cate, Fred H. "Communications, Policy-making and Humanitarian Crises." In Rotberg, Robert I and Thomas G. Weiss. *From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 18.

In the case of humanitarian events, this motivation is generally public outrage at the unfairness of the situation and sympathy for the victims. For example, in Bosnia and Somalia media presence made decisive action politically difficult to avoid because coverage made the public aware of events that government officials had been following for some time.

The media are essential in humanitarian crisis management, prevention, mitigation, and resolution. They serve to link victims, relief personnel, government officials, and the public. Most importantly, they are used to motivate public, political, and institutional responses to these events and to support rational policy-making and priority setting by decision-makers.²³ Difficulties arise, however when the speed of reporting interferes with the accuracy of the report and public attention is misinformed or misfocused, leading to faulty decision-making and inappropriate actions in response to the report rather than the actual event.

b. Media Distortion

Humanitarian crises create problems and put additional limitations on the media by virtue of their locations and the players involved. Accuracy suffers because of time and distance constraints. It is not feasible for reporters on the ground to research a story thoroughly when they are constantly trying to scoop their peers. Additionally, low technology third world nations make in depth research very time consuming, and often pointless if the desired records do not exist or are being held by a regime that is hostile to the press and others who try to interfere. Distortions that result from incomplete or incorrect information may lead to inappropriate actions by responding agencies and governments designed to fix the reported problem when that may not be the issue at all. As a result, public confidence in the government's ability to resolve the problem decreases along with public support, which in turn makes it difficult for policy makers to take action—a vicious cycle.

Distortions also arise because of what journalists and other media gatekeepers think qualifies as news. They want to attract and hold public attention with

²³ *Ibid*, p. 41.

what they report, so they publicize stories that will get ratings and downplay or ignore issues that are not of vital interest to their audience and events that are too slowly developing to rate a headline. Humanitarian crises and other international events too often fall in this category because the American populace at large has no context to put them in due to differences in culture, circumstances, and political and social situations that exist in the affected areas. These misunderstandings are compounded by audience exposure to only select stories. One-sided, overly negative and limited reports on conditions and events in other nations create a very limited image in the mind of Americans of what life is like in the third world. Such reports cause erroneous conclusions to be drawn about the root causes of events and what actions if any need to be taken to fix the problems that exist. Broadcast news is especially guilty, focusing on event based coverage because of the limited airtime available, typically sixty to ninety seconds for the top story with the rest relegated to sound bytes. There simply is not enough time allowed to cover an issue that develops over weeks, months, or even years, the public's attention span is too short and they lose interest too quickly. As a result, issues and possible solutions are simplified through pre-processing and then served up to an audience keeping up with the news more out of obligation than any real desire to learn.

More information does not necessarily mean that the public and the decision-makers are better informed of events in the world. It simply means that there is more information and thus a greater potential for information overload, especially with 24-hours news outlets such as CNN and the expanding use of the Internet for instant news. If anything, this is serving to further shorten the attention span of the American public and forcing them to choose a small selection of regular proven outlets from which to get their news and information. Protecting themselves from overload in this fashion has a huge effect on the public's perception of events because they are voluntarily restricting themselves to a minimal number of news sources and thus a minimal number of opinions and slants on the stories presented. The sheer amount of information, number of sources and the choices of program directors and editors based on popularity, ratings and current trends, are all concerns drawing journalists attention away from simply keeping the public informed.

Reporters go where the story is and where public interest is focused, and after a time that interest wanes, especially in the face of humanitarian crises a world away that have no direct impact on everyday lives in this country. A steady stream of stories from the front lines of the crisis result in eventual compassion fatigue and burnout among people who feel that they cannot personally make a difference.²⁴ Once this stage is reached, the public loses interest and the media pulls out, looking for the next big headline that will grab their audience's attention. The presence of the press is vital to maintain public support for international relief operations, because it keeps the crisis in focus. Once public attention fades and the media pulls out, relief efforts lose support as the crisis moves out of the public eye and off the agenda and is replaced with the new top story.

Example: Rwanda

The media can only deal with one major issue at a time; there can only be one top story. Political and other organizational decisions that go into making the choice of which story it will be, pushes others out of the spotlight. Lack of reporting results in a failure to prompt sufficient public attention and interest to effect timely action by governments, relief organizations, and other actors. This happened in Rwanda in 1994 where there was no widespread coverage of events until the killings were termed genocide by the media, and even then there was no real action taken by the US or other actors. In this case, there was a lot of early warning about events that were taking place, but media gatekeepers determined that there was not enough of a story there at the beginning to justify widespread coverage. In order to grab the headlines and generate public interest, correspondents need to find some angle that tugs the heartstrings in a new way.²⁵ There was no angle to the Rwanda story when it was "just" inter-tribal warfare, which the majority of Americans believe to be a constant state of affairs on the African continent. Additionally, with no reporters on the ground in Rwanda there was no video footage of what was going on and without that, the public has no real tie-in to events

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 58.

²⁵ Girardet, Edward R. "Reporting Humanitarianism: Are the New Electronic Media Making a Difference?" In Rotberg, Robert I and Thomas G. Weiss. *From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 58.

occurring a world away. Rather than reporting on the escalation of events that may have led to nothing, the media held off until the story really broke with genocide. By that time, it was too late for a meaningful intervention and such an action would never have had the support of the American public who had been conditioned over time to believe that such things were normal, over there.

c. Effects on the Public and Policy-Makers

Media have always been essential in shaping public opinion about mobilizing support for humanitarian crises. Television alerts the public to disasters and print outlets serve to shape attitudes toward the nature of the disaster and what must be done in response. But the press is unprepared and structurally unsuited to convey the full complexity of these types of situations to their audience. The problem lies in conveying an accurate, balanced and understandable view of these complex events that most of the general public has no context for understanding, all within the constraints of print and broadcast media. Crises need to be portrayed accurately if the appropriate response is to be taken, and this is just not possible with standard media operating procedures. Humanitarian organizations are guilty of the same thing when getting information out to the media; they want the simplest picture of the crisis to be broadcast so the solution seems simple. It is much easier for the public to get behind a simple, understandable solution that they can personally do something about like donating food or money, but if the entire background story and history of a crisis gets out it may seem too overwhelming and impossible to resolve and therefore not worth public attention or assistance. More often than not, the media focuses on their own best interests rather than those of the victims or their audience. They forgo being simply objective and informative for the sensational story that will garner the largest audience and the most revenue.

Ignorance of the true reasons behind a situation lead to inaccuracies in both reporting and response. A prime example of this is Rwanda, which was conveyed as inevitable inter-tribal conflict that had been going on for generations so there was nothing that could be done to stop it. A situation needs to reach critical mass in the public

consciousness before action is taken or demanded.²⁶ The problem is not a lack of information; rather the way the available information is organized, analyzed, and presented. The public needs a greater knowledge of countries, reliance on local sources, and a stronger critical edge rather than accepting current media methods and the stories they present as gospel. The media needs more independence from the government in its story choices, more stringent standards for balanced reporting, and to focus on more positive stories of other nations rather than relying on reactive foreign reporting.

Primetime television broadcasts and 24 hour news access allows rapid dissemination of information worldwide. Faster, more massive and more successful international response to emergencies results.²⁷ By getting the word out, the media creates a constituency for the victims among the public that they otherwise would not have. From that a feeling of responsibility is generated, mobilizing the public, and through them their leaders, to act. This is true for the beginning of the crisis, when it is still new and generating sympathy in the masses. Problems arise as time goes on and the story fades in popularity and the media begins focusing on the more negative aspects of the relief efforts rather than the problem itself, which loses audience attention quickly through compassion fatigue. The longer a crisis goes on, the more damaging instant news can be, undermining the very constituency it created because the reporters are looking for more headlines wherever they can find them rather than focusing on keeping the public informed of how the operation is proceeding or on providing support for the people in the field.

Heavy media coverage is a critical influence on policy-makers.²⁸ It also has a short term influence on the public in generating interest in current issues and events and constituencies for action. With the short attention span of the public, this does not work in the long term for developing problems, only hard-hitting sensational stories that

²⁶ Hammock, John C. and Joel R. Charny. "Emergency Response as Morality Play: the media, relief agencies, and the need for capacity building." In Rotberg, Robert I and Thomas G. Weiss. *From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 122.

²⁷ Rosenblatt, Lionel. "The Media and the Refugee." In Rotberg, Robert I and Thomas G. Weiss. *From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 136.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 138.

demand immediate attention. Decision-makers are affected in the same way. They do not see a situation as an emergency if it does not rate prime coverage by the media, which is a major influence on Washington's agenda for humanitarian crises. Government leaders use the print media for background information and ideas while television coverage keeps them abreast of new developments and issues that need immediate attention and action. Media attention plays an important role in influencing public policy toward humanitarian emergencies and narrowly focused situations where the solution seems simple and the public believes they can make a difference with relatively easy actions. It does not work in other arenas where the public bows to the expertise of government officials and policy-makers and the courses of action that they choose. It also does not work for every crisis. Only current crises with some sort of disaster as a trigger event are deemed as worthy of coverage, and therefore public attention.

Media coverage of disasters profoundly affects both public opinion and the policy-making process.²⁹ Sometimes the media take on a supportive role by getting the word out and providing information on an event, but at other times they can be a major factor in decision-making. The level of media influence and the ultimate action of policy-makers in response to coverage of an event depends on its importance to US interests, public and government awareness of the event, and the amount of publicity an event receives or generates. Policy-makers will support a quick and decisive response if the geopolitical or national interests of the US are threatened; in which case, media coverage is irrelevant to the level of response. US interests that will generate this type of response from policy-makers include: massive population movements such as refugee migration, economic collapse, and large scale natural disasters. Any of these events can threaten regional stability and the authority of the governing body in the affected country, having negative connotations for the US and the rest of the world.

It is when there are no US interests directly involved that media coverage plays an important role in focusing the attention of both policy-makers and the public on the crisis. If there is no geopolitical importance inherent in the event, US and world aid

²⁹ Natsios, Andrew. "Illusions of Influence: the CNN Effect in Complex Emergencies." In Rotberg, Robert I and Thomas G. Weiss. *From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 149.

agencies will initiate efforts if they have the resources and do not require outside approval, and the fewer links there are in the decision chain, the more likely a response is. Media coverage is not required for action to be taken by non-governmental organizations, but the publicity it generates can help gain public support for the aid operation and extend its life through donations of time, supplies and money. Increased publicity can also cause the government to take notice and begin a supplemental relief effort. For example, relief efforts for the famine in Somalia began in early 1992 even though there was no media coverage until June of that year. After the story broke, sustained coverage contributed to the launch of Operation Restore Hope by President Bush, where the military were used to further relief efforts.

d. Military Intervention

The military has been historically reluctant to act as security or logistical support for humanitarian operations and other such poorly defined missions where US interests are not directly involved as a legacy of the Vietnam era. Lack of training for such operations and the tendency for mission creep to escalate military presence for vague reasons makes the military and the public alike unwilling to accept such use of American forces, especially when those forces are needlessly put in danger. The problem is that with the United States' preeminence in the world, our influence as a nation is often needed to get other countries involved so that UN and other relief missions to succeed. Media coverage puts humanitarian crises on the public agenda, and that coupled with pressure from the UN to do something causes the public to react and force the government into actions that they otherwise would not take. None of this would happen without the media first focusing public attention. This does not work for all events. Massive media attention certainly has a hand in making policy in humanitarian emergencies where the US does not have direct political interests, especially in cases where the stories play on public emotions and they see a problem that is easily solved with funding or food. The public is receptive if it can relate humanitarian crises to everyday life and the welfare of the country as a whole, which is why famine in Somalia received a response while genocide in Rwanda did not.

F. SUMMARY

The media do not necessarily tell the public what to think, but do tell the public what to think about and also determine the public agenda. Characteristics such as placement, content, slant, repetition, format and ease of access all convey a message about the relative importance of an article and influence how the audience perceives them. Influence has the greatest effect when the stories are about something the audience has little or no personal experience with or context for understanding, such as foreign policy. They are forced to rely on the media as their sole source of information and thus it is easier for them to accept the pre-processed stories, views and opinions presented rather than developing their own.

Mass media do have an effect on policy through coverage, but only in the short term. The public has a short attention span, which when coupled with journalists' constant drive to find new stories causes headlines to change rapidly. Too often media story selection is based on concerns other than objectively informing the public, causing events to be ignored or passed over in favor of other more newsworthy ones. With the public being informed through media coverage, a trigger event worthy of media attention is required if first the story is to be covered, and second if influence is to occur. The media has the ability to affect government policy on an issue by influencing public opinion, but only if that issue makes it to press and is significant enough to draw concentrated media attention.

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III. US OPERATIONS AND POLICIES IN SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

The next step in exploring the effects of media influence on US foreign policy is to introduce the case study used for analysis. This chapter provides historical background on the Somali Civil War and famine that led to intervention by the United Nations and eventually the United States in the early 1990s. Following the history is a description of the UN missions to Somalia and the progression of US involvement from initial assistance to the events of 03 October 1993 and eventual withdrawal. Table 3.1 at the end of this chapter provides a timeline highlighting important events. Chapter IV will explore the media interpretation of these events through a review of newspaper articles.



Figure 3.1 Map of Somalia³⁰

³⁰“Somalia,” *CIA – The World Factbook – Somalia*. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.html>, 03 April 2002.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The early history of the Somali people can be traced to immigrants from Yemen who founded an Arab sultanate in the region in the Seventh century. Somalia's modern history began in the late 19th Century when European powers began trading with both their own colonies and other independent rulers throughout Africa. In a desire to protect trading routes the British, French and Italians all concluded treaties with clan leaders in the area and established a permanent presence in the Horn of Africa beginning in the 1860s. This state of affairs remained until after the Second World War when Somalia was made a UN protectorate under the control of Italy for a period of 10 years. The Somali Republic gained its independence on 01 July 1960.

In June 1961, Somalia adopted its first national constitution, providing for a democratic state with a parliamentary form of government. At first, political parties reflected clan loyalties and created a split based on regional interests. Additionally, there was conflict between pro-Arab, pan-Somali militants who wanted unification with ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya and the modernists who wanted to focus on economic and social development while improving relations with other African nations. The Somali Youth League eventually assumed control and succeeded in cutting across regional and clan loyalties for the good of Somalia as a whole. Under the leadership of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, prime minister from 1967 to 1969, Somalia greatly improved relations with its Kenyan and Ethiopian neighbors. Democracy ended in Somalia on 21 October 1969 when Major General Mohamed Siad Barre seized power with the support of the army and police forces.

The rulers of the new Somali Democratic Republic dissolved the national assembly and replaced it with the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) with twenty members and Barre as president. The SRC pursued the Soviet model in both ideology and economic policies, centralizing control of both information and production. Under Barre's leadership Somalia joined the Arab league and developed strong ties with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations. In the late 1970s these ties were broken after Somalia began supporting ethnic Somali rebels engaged in guerilla operations in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the Soviets sided with the Ethiopians. The US and Saudi Arabia backed the Somalis and the fighting continued until 1988 when Somalia and

Ethiopia signed a peace agreement. Throughout the conflict the US and other western powers were reluctant to provide military aid in the form of hardware or troops, but did provide emergency airlift support on several occasions.

With the end of the guerilla fighting, warfare among rival factions within Somalia intensified. Armed domestic opposition to Barre's regime began in the north in 1988 with the Somali National Movement who were joined by the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Ogadeni Somali Patriotic Movement. At the President's order, aircraft from the Somali National Air Force bombed cities in the north where these groups were known to be located, striking indiscriminately at both civilian and military targets. War in the north coupled with economic crisis led to further hardship as the collapsing nation was struck with famine and drought.

By 1990 the northern insurgency had been largely successful, leaving very little of the Somali Democratic Republic. The army had dissolved into armed groups declaring loyalty solely to former commanders or clan leaders. The economy was in shambles and over a million Somali refugees had fled to Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti. In 1991, Barre was ousted from power by nationalistic guerillas of the USC and forced into Nigerian exile. In the aftermath, two rival factions of the USC each proclaimed their own president. The Abgal sub-clan declared Mohammed Ali Mahdi president and Mohammed Farah Aidid was chosen by the Habr Gedir, and the fighting continued in a brutal civil war with these two sub-clans as the main combatant factions. Several other clan groups were also involved, but to a lesser degree. The worst African drought on record contributed to the appalling conditions and plunged the nation into a famine that would claim hundreds of thousands of lives.

C. US AND INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Various UN agencies including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and the United Nations Children's Fund, along with other Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) had been involved in humanitarian assistance in Somalia since the late 1970s. When civil war erupted in 1991, the UN was forced to close many of its offices in the country, which made it increasingly difficult for aid to reach those in need. In 1992, responding to the political chaos and

rising death toll in Somalia, the UN with support from the US and other nations, launched United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I or Operation Provide Relief) to provide humanitarian relief. This operation was followed on by the US led Unified Task Force (UNITAF or Operation Restore Hope) which provided military assistance to the humanitarian operation. The UN took over operations again with UNOSOM II, which had expanded enforcement power to disarm the Somali people and start the nation-building process.

1. UNOSOM I

The United Nations became officially involved in January of 1992 by sending an envoy to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, in the person of the Under Secretary General for Political Affairs with the aim of bringing about a cease-fire and securing access for relief agencies to aid those ravaged by famine and drought as well as civilian victims of the Civil War. The main factions fighting in Mogadishu, those belonging to Aidid and Mahdi, agreed to allow the UN to try and bring about national reconciliation and on 15 January 1992 the interim Prime Minister made an official request to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to convene and take action to resolve the situation in Somalia.³¹ This marked the beginning of the chain of events that would lead to the establishment of UNOSOM I. Acting on the request for help from the interim government, the UNSC adopted Resolution 733 to impose a general and complete embargo on weapons and military equipment in Somalia.³² A delegation composed of UN representatives, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference convinced the warring factions to accept the Resolution on 3 March and implement a cease fire beginning the in capital and eventually spreading to the rest of the country.

Though the cease-fire was in place, there were still some incidents of violence and continued difficulties with humanitarian aid reaching the needy. The Secretary General

³¹ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 17.

³² UNSC Resolution 733, 23 January 1992. In *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 4, p. 116.

responded by sending a monitoring team to Mogadishu to ensure the terms of the agreement were being upheld and to determine the best way to guarantee delivery of humanitarian assistance. Aidid and Mahdi, working with the representatives, signed agreements on 27 March to deploy UN observers and security forces to Mogadishu for just these purposes. These agreements became the foundation for UNSC Resolution 751, authorizing UNOSOM I on 24 April. The mission's mandate included: monitoring the cease-fire, providing security for UN personnel, escorting deliveries of humanitarian supplies, and convening a conference on national reconciliation.³³ The Security Council's main goal was to guarantee humanitarian aid. In order to do so, the nation's political problems, the root cause, would have to be solved first, therefore the conference was included in the mandate. On original deployment, UNOSOM I consisted of 50 unarmed UN observers (arriving on 23 July) and 500 infantry troops (arriving on 14 September) to provide security.

To tackle the humanitarian aid problem, the UN launched a 90-Day Plan of action to bring immediate assistance to the Somali population at the same time as UNOSOM I received its mandate. Results were seen quickly, as the first shipments were delivered in May 1992, but the overall amount was far less than was needed. Part of the problem was that UNOSOM was limited to operating in the capital, rather than being deployed country wide. Another major part of the problem was the lack of support the effort was receiving from the rest of the world due to the lack of coverage Somalia was receiving from the media. The world's focus was trained mostly on Bosnia at this point, and as discussed in Chapter II, the media can only handle one major story at a time. With print journalists and news broadcasters drawing public attention to the Balkans, there was no room in the headlines for Somalia. The Secretary General and various agencies working in-country helped to gain international media attention, which in turn caused the coverage to be expanded and forced world governments into action.³⁴ On 27 July, the UNSC approved emergency airlifts to get supplies to the interior portions of the country that has

³³ UNSC Resolution 751, 24 April 1992. In *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 12, p. 166.

³⁴ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 22.

previously been ignored. While this helped to get the aid to regions where it was needed, it was doing nothing for the overall crisis, which continued to intensify as food shipments were being attacked and looted by armed gangs running amok. On the same day, UNSC Resolution 767 divided the country into four operational zones.³⁵ Each zone to be staffed with 750 infantry troops for security, as stipulated by UNSC Resolution 775, which was approved on 28 August.³⁶ Logistical support was to follow in September, but none of these additional troops ever existed in Somalia beyond the planning stage. A further 100-Day Action Program was initiated to provide aid in September, but even with increased coordination between NGOs and the UN armed groups and faction members continued to interfere with distribution by attacks, looting, and forcing the closure of ports.

The situation became markedly worse in October when Aidid, who had previously agreed to UN presence and actions in Mogadishu, stated that the troops would no longer be tolerated and that any further deployments would be met with violence. He additionally demanded the expulsion of UNOSOM's Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance. Local faction leaders got into the act by spreading the word that the UN was intent on invading and taking over the country, leading to attacks on troops securing the airport and heavy shelling of any ships approaching port in Mogadishu. International aid workers were under siege during October and November as roving gangs had deemed the supplies as targets either for stealing or for demanding protection money from the agencies attempting to deliver them.³⁷ These ongoing problems were making it impossible for UNOSOM I to carry out its mandate in peacekeeping mode as written; peace-enforcement was needed.

³⁵ UNSC Resolution 767, 27 July 1992. In *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 16, p. 172.

³⁶ UNSC Resolution 775, 28 August 1992. In *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 24, p. 189.

³⁷ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 29.

2. UNITAF

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations permits the UNSC to authorize military action to restore peace and security. Invoking this right, and with the promise of military support from the United States, the Security Council determined that the conflict in Somalia was a threat to international peace and security, and adopted Resolution 794 on 03 December 1992. This Resolution authorized the use of all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, and also called for ongoing efforts to achieve a political settlement.³⁸ Full operational command of troops for Operation Restore Hope, as UNITAF was known, was assumed by the US, which had the largest contingent, not the UN, though they did work with the UNOSOM personnel on the ground in Mogadishu. There were 37,000 UNITAF troops deployed, with 28,000 belonging to the US and the remainder coming from more than 20 nations.

Stated US goals in Somalia were humanitarian in nature, seeking to provide a secure environment to enable the free distribution of aid to the populace. Resolution 794 authorizing UNITAF mentioned continued efforts at achieving a political solution for Somalia, but the actual mission focused more on military means rather than diplomatic ones, and did not attempt to further the government restoration process that the original UN mission was focused on. President Bush was adamant about limiting the mission to only providing a secure environment for aid while the UN worked with the Somalis to rebuild the government. He stressed that the US mission was solely a humanitarian one: to get in, get the food delivered and then get out, quickly. The UN had a different vision for them in terms of tasks while on the ground, but since UNITAF was under US rather than UN command, it followed the more limited US view of the mission. Comments by General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shortly before the Marine landing on 09 December summed up the US attitude toward the UNITAF mission, “It’s sort of like the cavalry coming to the rescue, straightening things out for a while and then letting the marshals come back to keep things under control.³⁹”

³⁸ UNSC Resolution 794, 3 December 1992. In *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 35, p. 214.

³⁹ Quoted in: Stevenson, Jonathan. *Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995, p. 51.

UNITAF forces rejected the mission of disarming the Somali militia, which had been one of the main objectives of their UNOSOM predecessors. They took a very limited view of what exactly “providing a secure environment” meant and did so by creating security zones around humanitarian aid delivery and distribution sites and the roads connecting them. They made great strides toward improving conditions in the country on the humanitarian side, but did nothing for disarmament beyond excluding weapons from the security zones. This worked while US forces were in the country, but the players involved knew the Americans were only in Somalia on a temporary basis and would be leaving in May 1993, to be replaced by a weaker UNOSOM II force. Aidid and his loyal militia along with other factions bided their time until they knew the Americans would be gone, using the intervening months to stockpile weapons and build up their own forces for when they could be used to an advantage against the UN Peacekeepers.

President Bush enforced this perception by sending in Ambassador Robert Oakley to negotiate a limited agreement with Aidid and Mahdi, days before the Marine landing. His mission was to obtain the cooperation of the warlords in a cease-fire lasting from December 1993 to May 1994, the predetermined length of UNITAF.⁴⁰ The US used its reputation for arms and military credibility to get a promise of temporary cooperation from the Somali militia where US prestige and power could have been used to further the entire UN mission rather than just to make UNITAF easier to implement.

US Marines landed on the beach in Somalia on 09 December 1992 forcing faction troops to withdraw to inland regions without so much as a fight. By the next day, planes were landing at Mogadishu airport with supplies, the ports were made safe for ships to dock, and the 100-day Action Plan was finally implemented. Additionally, UNITAF forces worked to repair infrastructure ensuring that delivery trucks could travel to regions that desperately needed emergency relief. Improved security helped the supplies get delivered and also helped the NGOs to expand their programs beyond providing food to include both emergency and preventive medical care and medicines. A month later, in January 1993, the worst of the famine was over and aid workers could begin to focus on long term solutions such as increasing local food production and refugee resettlement.

⁴⁰ Brune, Lester H. *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia 1992-1998*. Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1999, p. 24.

Working to solve the political problems at the root of the conflict, the Secretary General met with opposing faction leaders, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, and various community organizations and NGOs beginning on 04 January 1993 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Over the two week conference, the assembled groups agreed to a cease-fire, disarmament, and the creation of a monitoring group consisting of UNITAF and UN troops, all to be completed by March in time for a further conference on national reconciliation. Not all of the faction leaders stayed on course with the terms of the agreements, and two international aid workers were assassinated in January while in-fighting among the factions continued, despite partial disarmament and the presence of the UN teams.⁴¹ Faction leaders did meet again from 15-27 March and agree to end the hostilities, but with little credibility.

UNITAF was supposed to be a temporary show of force to create a secure environment for the delivery of aid, and once that was accomplished to hand over control to a follow-on peace-keeping mission. By the US limiting its actions so severely, the overall UN effort was ultimately hindered and this set the stage for the problems UNOSOM II encountered after assuming command from UNITAF in May 1993. Not only did this operation fail to work toward disarmament or the rest of the overall UN mission, but it suggested to Aidid and Mahdi (the two faction leaders Oakley dealt with) that they had to behave while the US was in charge of the operation but could revert to their previous behavior of attacking humanitarian aid personnel and supplies as soon as the US troops were gone. That is exactly what happened; 24 peacekeepers were killed in the series of ambushes that occurred on 05 June, just one month after command was transferred to UNOSOM II. In addition, by choosing to deal with only these two warlords, Oakley inferred legitimacy to their rule in Somalia that they used to build power and retain control of the people during UNITAF's mission. Focusing solely on military police actions to secure aid delivery routes meant that the US forces were unable to counter faction power consolidation or anti-US and anti-UN movements that continued to gain strength.

⁴¹ *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 39.

3. UNOSOM II

Reports to the UN concerning the failure of UNITAF to achieve a state of peace in Somalia resulted in UNOSOM II being changed from a peacekeeping mission to a peace-enforcement one, the first ever. Resolution 814 was passed by the Security Council on 26 March 1993 expanding the size of UNOSOM and widening its mandate to include, beyond disarmament and creating a safe environment for humanitarian assistance: assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.⁴² UNOSOM II personnel were authorized to use all necessary means, including enforcement to accomplish its mission. Command was formally transferred from UNITAF on 4 May, and the new operation was originally authorized through 31 October, though the last of the personnel did not depart until March of the following year.

The day after UNOSOM II received its mandate, the second Addis Ababa conference ended with an agreement between the two main factions and thirteen others, to end the conflict and continue the peace process under the auspices of the UN.⁴³ This agreement set out a two-year plan for the transition to a new central government, creating first local governments and then a Transitional National Council to interact with UNOSOM II and other nations and organizations until the new government was in place. Complete disarmament was a stipulation of the agreement, and was to be achieved within 90 days in coordination with UNITAF/UNOSOM personnel. UNOSOM II, in accordance with its expanded mandate, began implementing the Addis Ababa Agreement in April, but renewed tensions among the factions and open accusations and opposition to UNOSOM II's efforts by factions loyal to Aidid began to cause serious problems in June.

UNOSOM II's much less powerful military capability made it difficult to coerce the faction leaders into accepting peace and cooperating with disarmament. They were

⁴² UNSC Resolution 814, 26 March 1993. In *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 52, p. 261.

⁴³ Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia. In *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 53, p. 264.

fewer in number than the departed US force (14000 versus 37000), had to cover a greater area as UNITAF was deployed in only strategic areas rather than country wide, and had less equipment and training suitable for peace-enforcement. Under the original mandate for UNOSOM I, the mission was to be peacekeeping in nature. When UNITAF stepped in, they were to make the country “secure” through peace-enforcement and then return control back to peace-keeping forces. In limiting their operations to just protecting the humanitarian supplies, UNITAF forced the security council to change UNOSOM’s mandate to peace-enforcement and then use troops that were ill prepared for a mission of that nature. There was a US Quick Reaction Force consisting of 1100 specially trained troops stationed off shore to respond to emergency threats against UNOSOM II, but they could hardly be expected to coerce the same level of cooperation from the warlords as the 37000 UNITAF troops had previously.

UNOSOM II was headed by UN envoy and retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe; the force commander was Turkish General Cervik Bir. Several units including the French, Italians and the Quick Reaction Force did not necessarily obey this chain of command, seeking approval from their home governments before taking orders from the allied command. This breakdown in the command structure caused confusion among UNOSOM forces and outright refusals of some orders. In the mean time, Aidid was secure in his own power and began publicly decrying the UN on Radio Mogadishu, inciting protests against the organization’s presence in “his” country and further gaining the support of the people against “their enemy.”

Delays in troop deployments, equipment arrival and the unique challenges in integrating forces from countries with different languages, training and procedures all contributed to UNOSOM II operating below strength and ill-equipped. In this condition, the forces attempted to carry out an inspection of five weapons storage facilities in Mogadishu on 5 June, as per the Addis Ababa Agreement. Also pursuant to the agreement, the faction leaders were informed of the inspections ahead of time, and as a result the inspection teams were ambushed causing the deaths of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers and the wounding of 56 others. This incident was a definite challenge to the credibility of the UN forces and to their willingness to carry out their mandate. In response, the UNSC adopted Resolution 837 reaffirming that UNOSOM was authorized

to use all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks including their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment.⁴⁴

Due to the simultaneous nature of the ambushes on the inspection teams, the Security Council deemed them premeditated and identified Aidid as the mastermind behind them. Resolution 837 on 06 June authorized the use of all means to find and punish those responsible. This was the point where the mission stopped being about helping to deliver aid and became a manhunt. The political side of the mission was pushed to the back burner as well, making a long term solution even less likely. The focus had shifted from peace making and peace-enforcement to Aidid-hunting. After a further ambush on 17 June, Admiral Howe offered a \$25,000 reward for information leading to the warlord's arrest, to no avail. President Clinton stated that Aidid's forces were responsible for the worst attack of UN peacekeepers in three decades, and that the US could not let it go unpunished.⁴⁵ CIA agents were sent to try and track him down, but they too failed. A raid on a location purported to be Aidid's headquarters on 12 July resulted in the deaths of 54 Somali civilians. Following this, Aidid ordered his men to target and kill all Americans in Somalia, provoking General Montgomery, commander of the Quick Reaction Force, to request the deployment of additional special forces and equipment. His request was opposed by Congress, Secretary of Defense Aspin and General Powell, and was as such denied. This decision was reversed on 21 August after a landmine was responsible for the deaths of four US soldiers, and 400 Army Rangers and Delta forces were deployed as Task Force Ranger to assist UNOSOM II.

With the arrival of the new troops, raids against Aidid's forces and their bases increased in frequency. Consequently, there were more casualties to UN troops as Aidid responded by similarly increasing the number of attacks. UN forces were hard pressed to defend themselves or retaliate against militia gunmen using civilians for cover when attacking troops, bases and UN civilian facilities and humanitarian aid distribution centers. Additional attacks occurred on 17 June, 28 June and 7 July during which five, two and three UNOSOM peacekeepers lost their lives. The Quick Reaction Force

⁴⁴ UNSC Resolution 837, 6 June 1993. In *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 55, p. 267.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 31.

stepped up operations and began direct bombing attacks against faction compounds, but the ambushes continued resulting in 21 more deaths by 3 October. There were no attacks made directly against US troops, as the Somali militia focused on the Nigerian, Moroccan, Italian and Pakistani forces, only engaging the Americans when they arrived in response to an attack on their coalition allies. Task Force Ranger did have a higher profile in-country than the Quick Reaction Force had because they were constantly conducting surveillance and patrol missions by helicopter and actively seeking out Aidid's staff as well as hunting the man himself. The next incident involving American casualties occurred on 25 September when a US helicopter was shot down and three crew members lost their lives.

Congress responded immediately, passing a resolution asking the president to get congressional approval if US forces were to remain in Somalia later than 15 November. President Clinton did not respond immediately, and a week later on 3 October disaster struck. Task Force Ranger had been sent on a mission to raid the Olympic Hotel in downtown Mogadishu where intelligence reported a meeting was being held between Aidid and his staff. Twenty-four militia leaders were captured, but the Rangers were ambushed while taking the prisoners to the extraction point. Somali militia shot down two US Army Black Hawk helicopters and fought the Americans and responding UNOSOM II units for four hours, resulting in the worst single battle casualties of the entire UNOSOM mission dating back to its inception in 1992. Eighteen Americans and one Malaysian soldier were killed and ninety others were wounded. Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, the pilot of one of the helicopters was captured, brutalized and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, in full view of the international press. President Clinton came under pressure from the US public to change US policy in Somalia, and four days after the attack, on 7 October, he announced that US troops would withdraw completely by 31 March 1994 after ordering them to stop the hunt for Aidid, which had caused the escalation leading to this point.

As troops began planning to pull out a full year earlier than originally set forth in Resolution 814, it became increasingly difficult for the remaining forces to carryout their mission. In February, after a review of the situation, Resolution 897 further revised the mandate, removing the peace-enforcement provisions of Resolution 814 and reverting

UNOSOM II to a peacekeeping operation where force would not be used to achieve its mission objectives and weapons would only be used in self-defense.⁴⁶ The last US and European forces withdrew in March 1994, while the balance of the troops remained for another year. Their presence helped to solve the acute problems in Somalia, but they were unable to achieve a long term solution by rebuilding the country as stated in the lofty expectations of UNOSOM II's original mandate. UN political missions, observers and NGO operations have continued in Somalia treating the symptoms of the problem and helping the populace, but the underlying political difficulties remain despite many nation-building attempts.

The US made several mistakes in the Somali intervention that contributed to the ultimate failure of their mission. They based the UNITAF mission on a pre-determined time limit rather than a more meaningful measure of effectiveness, showing that the mission had no real goals in terms of US national interest to drive it. The advance notice of withdrawal allowed the Somali warlords to bide their time until the less credible UN troops were back in charge of security to resume their attacks on the humanitarian workers. US decision-makers also forgot that humanitarian operations were as much political as military and focused on only the latter portion of the mission, allowing the situation to destabilize further. When things began to get out of hand during UNOSOM II, the US began reacting to the militia attacks and altering their actions to become more police-like as they hunted for Aidid and those deemed responsible for American casualties. This put their original mission even further out of mind, losing even the objective of securing humanitarian supplies and delivery sites. By focusing too closely on the details, the US lost its perspective on the big picture as mission creep dragged them further and further from having a legitimate reason for Somali intervention. Once that was lost, US decision-makers needed a reason to withdraw that would seem legitimate to the public. It took 3 October to shift the US focus from military retribution to political reconciliation.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ UNSC Resolution 897, 4 February 1994. In *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VII. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, Document 77, p. 337.

⁴⁷ Stevenson, Jonathan. *Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995, p. 52.

Table 3.1 Somalia Timeline 1991-1994 UN Involvement until US withdrawal.

1991	
January 26	Civil War and famine Long-time dictator Siad Barre is exiled from Mogadishu. Conflict between the Somali National Movement (SNM), Aidid's party, and other factions causes clan infighting, leading to famine and lawlessness throughout portions of the country.
January 29	Interim Government Proclaimed One faction appoints Mahdi as interim president, and another backs Aidid.
November 17	Full scale war Mogadishu is divided into two zones by the major factions in the Civil War. The southern part controlled by Aidid's forces and the northern part by Mahdi's group. United Nations personnel evacuate the city.
1992	
January 23	UN Security Council Resolution 733 Urges all parties to cease hostilities and imposes a general and complete arms embargo on Somalia.
March 3	Ceasefire Warring faction leaders sign a ceasefire agreement, which includes provisions to allow a UN monitoring mission into Somalia to oversee arrangements for providing humanitarian assistance.
March 17	UN Security Council Resolution 746 Urges the continuation of UN humanitarian aid in Somalia and provides for a technical team to be sent to Somalia to study the problem and develop a plan for a permanent solution.
April 24	UN Security Council Resolution 751 Approves UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor the cease-fire and provide military escort for the UN convoys of relief supplies.
August 12	Operation Provide Relief (United Nations Operation in Somalia – UNOSOM I) UN humanitarian relief effort begins with an initial deployment of 50 observers and 500 infantry troops.
August 28	UN Security Resolution 775 Authorizes an increase in UN security personnel to 3500.
October 28	Actions against UNOSOM Aidid declares that the Pakistani UNOSOM battalion is no longer welcome in Mogadishu and orders the expulsion of the UNOSOM coordinator.
November 12	Actions against UNOSOM Aidid demands the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops from Mogadishu airport, and attacks them when they refuse to leave.

November 23	Actions against UNOSOM Forces loyal to Mahdi blockade Mogadishu harbor and shell ships that attempt to enter and deliver food.
November 25	US proposal to the UN The US offers to take the lead in organizing and commanding a military operation to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to Somalia, with the approval of the security council.
December 3	UN Security Council Resolution 794 Authorizes the use of all necessary means to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia, accepting the offer made by the US and asking other member nations to make contributions either in cash, resources or operationally.
December 9	US initiates Operation Restore Hope as UNITAF, the Unified Task Force US combat troops lead an international UN force to ensure the safety of humanitarian aid workers so the food and supplies can reach the intended recipients. UNITAF builds to a peak of 37000 troops, securing the control of nine key towns and guarding ports, airports, and food distribution centers while escorting food convoys.
1993	
January 4-15	First Addis Ababa Conference Fifteen Somali factions reach an agreement to cease hostilities, demobilize and disarm, turning weapons over to a UN monitoring team provided by UNITAF and UNOSOM.
March	Cease-fire broken In violation of the agreement negotiated in January, Somali forces commanded by Siad Hersi, son-in-law of ex-dictator Siad Barre, capture the town of Kismayo after weeks of fighting troops loyal to Aidid.
March 26	UN Security Council Resolution 814 Authorizes UNOSOM II with expanded enforcement power to ensure safety for humanitarian relief workers, taking over from UNITAF. Primary mandates focus on disarmament and nation building.
March 27	Addis Ababa Accords The UN organized Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, results in a resolution among faction leaders, including Aidid, to end the violence. The accords provide for disarmament under UN supervision and a two-year transition to the formation of a new national government.
May 4	UN takeover via UNOSOM II UNOSOM II formally assumes responsibility for creating a secure environment in Somalia, supported by the Quick Reaction Force, which is under direct US command.
June 5	Massacre of Pakistani troops During an inspection of a Somali arms weapons storage site, 24 Pakistani soldiers are ambushed and massacred. Ten others went missing and 54 were wounded in a series of attacks against UNOSOM II personnel in Mogadishu by Aidid's forces.

June 6	UN Security Council Resolution 837 Strongly condemns the attack and reaffirms that under Resolution 814 the Secretary General is allowed to take all necessary actions against those responsible, including arrest, detention and punishment.
June 8	Special Forces requested In the aftermath of the June 5 massacre, Admiral Howe first requests a counterterrorist hostage rescue force from Washington because they he they needed more extensive military capability to deal with the escalating violence. No such troops are forthcoming until Task Force Ranger is deployed in August.
June 12-16	Attacks on Aidid's strongholds US and UN troops begin attacking various targets in Mogadishu associated with Aidid, including a radio station and ammunition depots. The peacekeepers are now at war with Aidid.
June 17	Arrest warrant Admiral Howe issues an arrest warrant for General Aidid, the mastermind behind the ambushes on 5 June.
July 12	Abdi house attack In a major escalation, American Cobra helicopters attack a house in south Mogadishu where a group of clan leaders are meeting, destroying the building with TOW missiles and cannon fire killing 54 Somali civilians. Four western journalists who had gone to investigate are beaten to death by an angry mob.
August 8	Americans killed by land mines Four American military police are killed by a remote detonated land mine set off by Somalis. Two weeks later on 21 August, six more US soldiers are wounded in a similar attack.
August 26	US Special Forces arrive in Somalia US Army Task Force Ranger flies into Mogadishu -- 400 elite troops from Delta Force and the U.S. Rangers. Led by Major General William F. Garrison, their mission is to capture Aidid. They begin pursuing Aidid and his top lieutenants, with sporadic success.
September 25	Congressional resolution After the downing of a US helicopter killed three American soldiers, Congress passed a resolution asking the president to get Congressional approval if US troops were to remain in Somalia past 15 November 1993.
October 3-4	Blackhawk Down Task Force Ranger's assault on the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, in search of Aidid, results in a seventeen hour bloody battle in which US casualties number 18 killed and 84 wounded.
October 7	Clinton's response: withdraw troops President Clinton sends substantial combat troops as short term reinforcements, but declares that American troops are to be fully withdrawn from Somalia by March 31. Several other countries subsequently announce they will withdraw their contingents within the same timeframe.

October 9	Cessation of Hostilities Aidid's faction declares a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II forces, but other groups outside of the capital continue fighting.
October 29	UN Security Council Resolution 878 Extends the UNOSOM II mandate until November 18, when it is then extended for another six months.
1994	
February 4	UN Security Council Resolution 897 Approves the continuation of UNOSOM II with a reduction in forces to 22000 and sets an objective of completing the implementation of the 27 March 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement by March 1995.
March 24	Declaration of National Reconciliation Aidid and Mahdi agree to implement a cease-fire and voluntary disarmament and to restore peace throughout Somalia.
March 25	Remaining US forces leave Somalia Approximately 20,000 UN forces remain, composed primarily of Asian and African contingents.

D. SUMMARY

Somalia, the only totally failed state in history, garnered international attention in the early 1990s when Civil War erupted forcing the UN and other NGOs to abandon humanitarian aid programs that had been in place since the 1970s. Coupled with the worst drought in that nation's history, famine killed hundreds of thousands before the media stepped in and named the situation a tragedy in 1992. The UN responded to public outcry with a series of missions: UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II, lasting until March 1995, that helped to ease the humanitarian crisis but did not solve the underlying political problems. The US became involved in December of 1992 with UNITAF and remained until May 1994.

Beginning in June of 1993, armed resistance to UN soldiers by Somali militia factions increased in severity to outright ambushes and attacks. This prompted further troop deployment by UN members including Task Force Ranger from the US. The Task Force's mission was to hunt for Aidid and his staff who were responsible for the attacks and the deaths of nearly 50 UN peacekeepers between 5 June and 3 October 1993. The Black Hawk down incident occurred on 3 October, resulting in the deaths of 18

Americans and one Malaysian and the wounding of 90 others. One American was captured, beaten and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Four days after this incident, President Clinton stated that US troops would pull out by 31 March 1995.

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IV. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND OPINION POLLS DURING THE US INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

The next step in exploring the effects of media influence on US foreign policy is to present the data being analyzed. This chapter presents newspaper articles and opinion polls covering the time of US involvement in Somalia from 1992 to 1994. After being introduced, each data set is analyzed to discover trends in reporting and public opinion in relation to the events described above in Table 3.1.

B. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

The Lexis-Nexis Database, was used to search for and then create a data set containing newspaper articles about the US intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1994.⁴⁸ A search was conducted in the General News category of the News database for articles about “Somalia” written between 01 January 1991 and 31 March 1995, a time period spanning from the beginning of the Somali Civil War to the end of the UN mission. The search was then narrowed by adding the terms “Operation Restore Hope” and “US troops,” resulting in a list of over one thousand articles. To make this number more manageable The Los Angeles Times was chosen to be the single source of newspaper articles for this research. Doing this made several of the variables discussed in Chapter II relating to media story choice by gatekeepers irrelevant, and created a stable foundation on which to base a study of the changes in public opinion. The Los Angeles Times was chosen as the representative paper because of its large readership, the fact that several other articles returned by the search engine used the LA Times as a source document, and because it was the newspaper with the most articles (106) listed in the search results. Appendix A contains a list of the articles sorted by date with the following information for each: publication date, section, length, headline, byline and dateline. Full text for each article can be accessed through Lexis-Nexis.

⁴⁸ The Lexis-Nexis Universe can be accessed through the Dudley Knox Library website at: <http://web.nps.mil/%7Elibrary/Welcome.html>, under databases.

1. The Los Angeles Times

The Times is the largest metropolitan daily newspaper in the United States with an average daily circulation of one million, combining local and national readers. There are four daily regional editions covering the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the San Fernando Valley, and Orange and Ventura counties. A national edition is distributed to markets in Northern California, New York, Washington DC and other major cities on the East Coast. Stories are contributed by 23 foreign, nine national and five California bureaus, giving The Times the largest editorial staff in California, and one of the largest in the world. Weekday editions of the Times contain seven sections: Main News, California (Metro), Business, Sports, Southern California Living, Calendar and Classifieds. Weekly sections include: Health, Food, World Report and Calendar Weekend. The Sunday edition contains Book Review, Sunday Calendar, Comics, Los Angeles Times Magazine, Opinion, Real Estate, Travel and TV Times in addition to the standard sections.⁴⁹ Section content is broken down in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1 Section Content Descriptions for The Los Angeles Times by Edition.

Edition	Section	Description
Daily	A. Main News	International, national, state, regional and local news
	B. California	State and local news and features, editorials, letters to the editor, opinion and weather
	C. Business	Local, national and international business and financial news with index lists for stocks, bonds, mutual funds and commodities
	D. Sports	Sports coverage including: features, statistics and commentary
	E. Southern California Living	Community, social and cultural events, lifestyles, trends, fashion, consumer and family issues, comics and daily crossword
	F. Calendar	Reviews and listings for movies, radio, television, theater, art, music and dance
	G. Classifieds	Classified advertisements

⁴⁹ *Los Angeles Times*. <http://www.latimes.com>, 22 April 2002.

Edition	Section	Description
Sunday	Sunday Calendar	Arts and entertainment guide with feature articles and interviews
	Real Estate	Information on buying, selling, financing, renting and caring for your home
	Travel	Vacation planning ideas and resources
	Opinion	Expanded Sunday editorial section
	Book Review	Reviews of the latest releases and The Times' best seller lists
	Comics	Full color
	LA Times Magazine	Profiles of influential Southern Californians and local issues
	TV Times	Customized listings

2. Article Analysis

The first article in the data set (Article 1 in Appendix A) was published on 06 December 1992, three days after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 794 accepting the US offer of help to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. The search did not return any articles prior to this time, suggesting that gatekeepers within the Los Angeles Times organization did not deem the situation in Somalia worthy of coverage until there was an active US interest involved. In this case, the interest was the deployment of troops abroad for a humanitarian mission. Coverage continued until April of 1994, at which time all US troops had been withdrawn from the area.

Articles on the Somali situation were not evenly distributed throughout the timeframe of the search. Stories were published more frequently during the following months: December 1992, March 1993, May 1993 and October 1993 as shown in Figure 4.1. Events significant to the overall mission occurred during three of these months, as described in Table 3.1. December 1992 marked the beginning of US involvement with the UN mission in Somalia through UNITAF and Operation Restore Hope. Articles for this time period covered the mission definition, Marine beach landing on 09 December, media presence on the beach, the positive outlook of the soldiers, Somalis welcoming the Americans with open arms and how quickly US forces were able to establish bases and begin to get humanitarian aid delivered. US forces turned command over to UNOSOM II

personnel in May 1993. That month's stories reflected the success of the mission in stopping famine and the fact that Somalia served as a training ground for future humanitarian operations. The Blackhawk Down incident occurred in October 1993, followed by President Clinton's decision to withdraw US troops by 31 March 1994. Articles for this period discussed the increasingly hostile conditions in Somalia, the casualties to US and UN forces since June, questions about the nature of the mission, and the need for American troops to come home. March 1993 also showed an increase in the number of articles published, but not for an event shown on the UN timeline. The Addis Ababa Accords were signed at the National Reconciliation Conference, providing the legal backing for the UN to launch UNOSOM II, but the articles published in The Times focused on the court martial of a Marine Gunnery Sergeant for excessive use of force.




Figure 4.1 Number of Articles on Somalia Published in the Los Angeles Times by Month

The lack of articles during other time periods shown in Figure 4.1 reflect the lack of significant actions on the part of US forces in Somalia, but not the lack of important events on the UN timeline. Immediately after US forces left in May 1993 and UNOSOM II officially took command, coverage by the LA paper stopped. The Times did not publish any further articles on Somalia until the end of August when Task Force Ranger was deployed. There was one feature article in the LA Times Magazine in June, but it was an overview of Operation Restore Hope as seen through the eyes of a Marine Company based out of Twentynine Palms, CA. This was mainly a human interest piece

about LA “locals” seeing action; no new information was presented. Starting on 05 June, one month after the US departure and continuing through the summer, Somali militia under the command of Aidid carried out a series of raids against UNOSOM personnel, killing over fifty. Yet, no articles were published in The Times until 29 August when US Special Forces were deployed to assist in hunting down Aidid. Another gap in reporting was broken on 26 September when an American helicopter was shot down and three US soldiers were killed. Stories picked up again on 04 October with coverage of the Blackhawk Down incident, and a full 25% of the articles in the data set were published during that month. US military activities in Somalia fell off in the aftermath of the incident, and so did newspaper coverage. There was a virtual blackout in The Times until March 1994 when the Americans pulled out.

These trends in the timing of coverage shows that in order for a story to be published, the event must have significance to the American public. The overall situation in Somalia was not of national interest to the United States because US does not have any treaties with Somalia, economic interest in the area and does not gain any particular military advantage by maintaining a presence there. Because of this, events in Somalia are not newsworthy to Americans unless Americans are involved. This is clearly seen in the trends described above as coverage is maintained through out the initial US deployment for UNITAF, falls off after the initial withdrawal, spikes after the American casualties in October, and then all but disappears afterward. This leads to the further observation that American presence does not guarantee newspaper coverage, there first needs to be a significant event to draw media attention. But, no matter how significant the event, it will eventually become old news through audience fatigue will fade from the headlines.

Another important trend is the tone in which the articles are written, either positive, negative or neutral. The tone determines the audience’s perception of the information being presented. At the beginning of the US deployment to Somalia, the articles are mostly positive, focusing on the humanitarian nature of the mission, the anticipated ease at completing it, the Somali welcome of the Marines, and the quick success at getting food delivered. Things begin to change after the Marines had been in-country for about a month, long enough for the Somali militia to get used to their

presence and adjust accordingly. In January 1993, the militia begin acting in a hostile fashion and resume attacking humanitarian supplies and distribution points. When a Marine is killed on 26 January, there is an immediate reaction in the press. Articles appear that question US presence in Somalia, ask why taxpayers are responsible for funding the effort, and begin to describe Somalia as hostile territory. Positive and negative stories then remain relatively balanced until UNITAF ends in May, and the articles become positive once again when they reflect on the success of the US mission. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution in tone among the 70 articles on Somalia published before 29 August 1993 (Articles 1 through 70 in Appendix A.) The positive articles outweigh the negative ones, naming UNITAF a success.




Figure 4.2 Tone of LA Times Articles on Somalia from 09 Dec 1992 to 28 Aug 1993

There is a drastic change in tone beginning with the deployment of Task Force Ranger at the end of August 1993, after which time the remaining 36 articles in the data set all have a negative slant. The first article (Article 71) published on 29 August, describes the situation in Somalia as getting out of hand with the US changing its mission drastically from humanitarian assistance to a manhunt, while the UN is being completely ineffective at providing a long term solution to the problem. The remaining articles continue to reflect negatively on the US presence in Somalia, recounting the deaths of UN peacekeepers since the beginning of the summer, mission drift and continuing to question US presence. The end of September brings open criticism from Congress and demands that the President set a withdrawal date. Article 78 on 04 October is the first

after the incident, and the negativity continues from there until the final article in April. Not only do the articles focus on Somalia, but they also call into question President Clinton's ability to do his job and future US roles in both UN and other humanitarian operations, namely Bosnia and Haiti. The negative articles outweigh the positive ones, making the US intervention in Somalia a failure, regardless of previous feelings to the contrary, and suggesting that future operations of a similar nature will also end poorly.




Figure 4.3 Tone of all LA Times Articles on Somalia from 09 Dec 1992 to 01 April 1994

Trends in the tone of articles can help determine what it takes to influence actions on the governmental level. Policies started changing after the American deaths on 03 October, but there had been previous American deaths that did not evoke such a response. The first American casualty came in January and there was an uproar of negativity from the press, but Operation Restore Hope carried on, continuing to succeed in its humanitarian endeavor. As a result positives balanced out the negatives and no significant policy changes were made in the wake of the first US death in Somalia. Four further casualties on 08 August helped to bring Task Force Ranger into the picture. Admiral Howe, the UNOSOM II commander, had been asking for Special Forces help against the Somali militia since the ambushes in the beginning of June, but was refused repeatedly and over 50 UN peacekeepers died. None of these events made The Times, but the eventual deployment of the Rangers on 26 August did amid more negativity, but it was still not enough to galvanize Congress into action. It would take the downing of a US helicopter on 26 September for Senator Nunn to criticize Clinton's actions in Somalia and call for a withdrawal date to be set (Article 74.) The President promised to consider

it, but did not want to act hastily. A week later it was 03 October and too late to prevent a tragedy. The press lashed out with negativity that this time would not let up, and three days later Clinton had redefined a limited US policy in Somalia and set a date for all troops to return home.

The sequence of actions here supports the earlier observation that events will not be noticed unless they are significant enough to warrant the country's undivided attention. Previous American and coalition casualties were unable to do this because they were either not significant enough in number, could be balanced against positive mission accomplishments (the "it was worth it" argument), or simply did not seem newsworthy to media gatekeepers at the time so were not published. The incident on 03 October made everyone take notice of "that mess in Somalia" as the situation was referred to in Article 81. The mess consisted of: two downed helicopters, 19 dead and 90 wounded of which two, 18 and 78, respectively were American. It put a negative spin on the entire Somali intervention, causing it to be almost constantly compared to America's other great failure—Vietnam. As soon as that happened, Clinton had to act and drew up a six month exit strategy for US forces to ensure that they would leave, but without completely destabilizing the country and destroying UN chances at working out a political solution.

C. OPINION POLLS

The Lexis-Nexis Database was used to search for and create a data set of opinion polls for the time period of the US intervention in Somalia from 1992 to 1994. A search was conducted in the Polls and Survey section of the General Reference category within the database, which contains the archives of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.⁵⁰ Using the time frame bracketed by the newspaper articles selected previously, a search was made for polls relating to "Somalia" between December 1992 and April 1994. The resulting 500 polls were then reviewed to discard duplicates and questions that did not fall into one of the following categories: mission approval, mission goals, pullout conditions, and whether the mission was worth it or not. The resulting

⁵⁰ The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research is a non-profit education and research organization in the field of public opinion and public policy, and has access to polling data from Gallup, Harris, Roper, ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, USA Today and Wall Street Journal.

polls fall within the time period between December 1992 and December 1993. Appendix B contains a list of the 76 selected polls sorted into groups and by date within each group. The following information is provided for each poll: question, results, organization conducting the survey, population polled, number of participants, interview method, survey sponsor, date and source document. Demographic breakdowns for each survey can be accessed through Lexis-Nexis.

1. The Polling Process

The polls selected for analysis are from various sources including the Gallup Organization, ABC and CBS News, the Harris Poll and the New York Times. They were all conducted as telephone interviews with a randomly selected group representative of the national adult population. Table 4.2 shows the demographic breakdown for Poll 1 as conducted by the Gallup Organization, where 602 respondents were asked on 03 December 1992 if they approved of President Bush's plan to send US forces to aid in humanitarian relief in Somalia. The Gallup poll uses a computer generated list of all possible household phone numbers in the US from which to randomly select a group of 500 to 1000 to represent a cross-section of the American public. Once the sample list is complete, trained interviewers use computer assisted telephone interviewing technology, which brings the survey questions up on a computer monitor and records the responses, allowing for continuous and automatic tabulation of results. The computer prompts the interviewer with one of multiple formulations of the same question to minimize the impact of wording on survey responses. To correct for bias based on the polling method, the interviewers go to extensive lengths to reach an adult respondent at the selected number. If the line is busy or there is no answer, the number is repeatedly called back during the survey period until there is a response, ensuring that individuals are not dropped from the sample because they are not home or are on the phone during the initial call. Interviewers also try to randomly select an individual in the house rather than defaulting to the person who initially answers the phone in households with more than one adult.⁵¹ The process used for the Gallup Poll is similar to that used by other polling organizations when conducting telephone surveys.

⁵¹ The Gallup Organization. "*How polls are conducted.*" <http://www.gallup.com/help/FAQs/poll1.asp>, 63

Table 4.2 Demographic Breakdown of Respondents to Poll 1.

Population	Number	Response (%)		
		Approve	Disapprove	Do not know/ Refused
Male	299	69	23	8
Female	303	63	24	13
White	535	66	22	12
Black	32	64	31	5
Asian	9	61	39	0
< HS grad	56	58	26	16
HS graduate	224	61	27	12
Some college	160	71	20	9
College grad	160	74	20	6
East	125	67	26	8
Midwest	151	65	18	17
South	210	65	26	9
West	116	66	25	9
Republican	173	74	16	9
Democrat	203	64	28	8
Independent	198	63	26	11
18-29 years old	115	65	27	8
30-39	130	69	23	9
40-49	127	75	18	7
50-59	87	68	18	13
60-69	66	62	23	16
70 and over	72	49	36	14

2. Poll Analysis

The 76 sets of poll results listed in Appendix B are organized by subject grouping to facilitate the identification of trends in public opinion over time. The subject groups chosen for analysis are: mission approval, mission goals, pullout conditions, and mission worth. Figure 4.4 shows the group breakdown. These subjects were chosen over others

such as mission length because they are issues that government decision-makers have to take into account when either creating or modifying policy or recommending new courses of action.




Figure 4.4 Breakdown of Opinion Polls by Analysis Grouping

The first group of results (Polls 1 through 32 in Appendix B) selected for analysis track the change in public approval of the mission over time, with a peak approval rating of 81% occurring on 07 December 1992 and a low rating of 21% on 06 October 1993. This trend is shown in Figure 4.5. Throughout the original UNITAF mission, public approval remained above 70%. There was no significant change in approval rates after the January death of a Marine during a raid on the airport. Support only began to drop off after the departure of UNITAF troops when the Quick Reaction Force began to act as a police unit tracking militia groups responsible for ambushing UN Peacekeepers during the summer of 1993. Further declines in public support were recorded after the deployment of Task Force Ranger in late August with their assigned mission of hunting down Aidid. The greatest decrease in the mission approval rating occurred in reaction to the events of 03 October 1993. The public was mollified by President Clinton's announcement of both a return to the humanitarian definition of the mission and the setting of a mission end-date in March 1994. As long as US forces in Somalia were operating in accordance with the original mission definition of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, the public remained solidly behind the conduct of the mission. The moment the mission changed to peace enforcement and then a manhunt, public support

fell off rapidly. Support was at 40%, half of the original level at the end of September 1993 when Congress began publicly speaking out against continued US presence in Somalia and asking the President to set a firm withdrawal date. Clinton deferred his decision until a week later, after 03 October. At this point, public opinion was standing at 21%, half that of the previous week. Immediately after Clinton's announcement on 07 October, support rebounded to 36% and then remained at or near that level for the rest of the year.




Figure 4.5 Trend in Public Approval for the Mission in Somalia from Dec 1992 to Oct 1993

Looking back after the incident on 03 October 1993, the public approval of the original decision to launch the mission back in December of 1992 remained relatively constant, as shown in Table 4.3. The negative change in opinion about the mission shown in Figure 4.5 is due to developments on the ground since the original deployment, not a change in the public mindset about whether delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia is the right thing to do. Mission approval is significantly lower than it was in December of 1992 because after a year of operating in Somalia, the public has more information to consider when rating the decision in October of 1993 than they had at the beginning of UNITAF. All of this information has built up during the life of the mission and is used by the public when processing new developments, as discussed in Chapter II. Consciously or unconsciously, the public weighs contributing factors and their own preconceived notions about Somalia, the pros and cons of humanitarian aid, the use of US

troops for operations other than war, and of course the casualties that have accrued. The result is an overall lowering in the mission approval rating as the public weighs the consequences of involvement, while support remains at about 60% because of the nature of the mission. Humanitarian aid is an easy mission to support when you consider the suffering of the victims, the relatively easy solution to hunger and the prosperity of the US versus that of Somalia. Public opinion as to whether the mission was worth the cost (Polls 70 through 76,) shown in Figure 4.6, follows a trend similar to that of public opinion, probably due to these same though processes.

Table 4.3 Public Approval of the Original Decision to Launch the Mission

Polling date	Approval Rating
5 October 1993	56%
6 October 1993	63%
7 October 1993	64%
18 October 1993	67%
5 December 1993	62%




Figure 4.6 Trend in Positive Responses to the Survey Question: Is the mission in Somalia worth the cost? From Dec 1992 to Dec 1993

Public approval of the mission goals (Polls 33 through 52) is more difficult to track than approval of the overall mission due to the fact that the goals were constantly changing throughout the US intervention. The original stated mission objective was to provide security to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the people of Somalia, which the public was solidly behind, as described above. Approval rates for the other missions that US troops conducted while in Somalia never reached the same levels. One of missions included the UN nation building effort aimed at creating a stable government and provide a long term political solution to the inter-clan rivalries that were the root cause of the Civil War and famine. President Bush stated outright that Operation Restore Hope would be focusing solely on the humanitarian side of the operation and making the country secure for aid delivery before returning command to UN forces who would then continue the mission of political reconciliation. This was never a primary goal of the US forces in Somalia, though diplomatic efforts were made to smooth the way for UNITAF's entry into the county. Other missions developed as both UN and US forces adapted to operations in Somalia and the constant challenges presented by the roving militia and constant ambushes that followed first US exit. During the summer, Admiral Howe declared a bounty on Aidid, adding his capture to the ever expanding mission task list. The UN Security Council exacerbated the situation by passing Resolution 837 calling for the arrest, detainment and punishment of those responsible for the ambushes. Public approval was continuing to fall at this time, and then 03 October triggered a desire within the public withdrawing US troops completely.

No mention of a withdrawal was made until polls conducted on 05 October, directly after the Blackhawk Down Incident, but with it came more questions, specifically when and how to leave. The set of missions before US forces led to the development of a complex set of pullout conditions (Polls 53-69) taking into account both the timeframe of the pullout and what mission objectives needed to be achieved before leaving. Sixty percent of the public lobbied for immediate withdrawal. The majority did not feel that waiting for either the humanitarian crisis to be solved, a political solution to be reached or Aidid to be captured were significant enough to risk further incidents. When asked 30% of respondents chose one of these options over immediate withdrawal, but when the question was altered, 76% wanted to wait until the US hostages had been recovered

before leaving. The American public wanted all of its troops back. President Clinton had to look at the bigger picture when deciding to delay withdrawal for six months. He did not want to be responsible for further destabilizing the situation in Somalia, which would prevent the UN from completing its original mission. He also did not want his actions to be dictated by Aidid, which could undermine his authority and ability to act in future missions such as Bosnia and Haiti.

D. SUMMARY

Print coverage of the US intervention in Somalia was sporadic, picking up only when a significant event such as the original deployment of US troops and the tragedy of 03 October 1993 occurred. There were other important events that occurred, as shown in the UN timeline in Table 3.1, but most of them did not rate immediate publication in the Los Angeles Times because they were not of direct interest to the American public. As the public followed the news coverage, opinions were altered as the audience's attention was drawn to specific events, usually negative ones. News coverage after the end of UNITAF was all negative in nature, focusing on the increasingly hostile environment soldiers were facing in Somalia and the casualties suffered by UN Peacekeepers and US Special Forces. The negative slant in these stories, the public's only source of information on events in Somalia influenced their opinions along the same lines, causing support to decline, especially after 03 October. The fact that public opinion rebounded after Clinton's announcement on 07 October suggests that it was a factor in his decision to set a withdrawal date and limit the nature of US operations in Somalia.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

What are the effects of media influence on US foreign policy? This chapter brings together the ideas and information presented in the previous four chapters to answer this question. Additionally, this chapter provides recommendations on how government and military decision makers can use the media to a strategic advantage so that US national policy is not adversely affected by isolated trigger events, and suggests areas for further research.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The media shape public opinion by controlling access to information through gatekeeping, framing and agenda setting, which result in stories that are incomplete and biased. American audiences receive these preprocessed news stories and accept them as fact because the source is trusted. This is especially true when the subject of the story is something that the audience has no personal context for evaluating. For example, the general public relies exclusively on the media for their knowledge of foreign policy and military operations. Thus stories on these subjects are most likely to be accepted at face value and used to form opinions about events and operations as they occur.

Media coverage of the US intervention in Somalia from December 1992 to March 1994 and corresponding changes in public opinion show the influence the media exert. During the beginning of the intervention, news reports were positive and focused on the ease of the mission and how quickly US forces were achieving success. At this point, public opinion was solidly in favor of the short term humanitarian mission. Changes began to occur after the departure of the US UNITAF troops and the UN Peacekeepers began to encounter increased resistance from the Somali militia. As the operation moved away from humanitarian relief and into a more military mode, media reporting changed as well. It began to focus on what was going wrong in Somalia, the ambushes on US and UN troops and the casualties that each suffered. American audiences responded to the negativity of these reports by beginning to think less highly of the mission. Public approval dropped to an all time low after the deaths of 18 US Army Rangers on 03

October 1993. Continued negativity from the press and demands for US troops to return home resulted in President Clinton's announcement on 07 October of a return to humanitarian operations and the setting of a withdrawal date. Almost immediately public opinion rebounded, not to previous levels, but there was a definite improvement. Media attention to the famine in Somalia drove public opinion to get the UN and later the US involved and then un-involved rather quickly when things got ugly.

The Blackhawk Down incident was the trigger incident that caused US policy in Somalia to change virtually overnight. The mission had been losing public support since mid-summer 1993 when the focus shifted from humanitarian aid to a more military type of operation, but there was no overwhelming reason to call the troops home. Somalia was simply not drawing enough attention back home because the public was focused on other stories like Bosnia and the American economy. These subjects were receiving more media attention than Somalia because they were more immediate and more interesting; Somalia had stopped being the top story when the bulk of the UNITAF troops returned home in May 1993. Because of this, there was not enough current information on the mission in Somalia for the public to change its opinion in a drastic way. The events of 03 October 1993 were shocking enough to grab the attention first of the press and then the public. The negatively framed articles that resulted provided the "proof" needed by the public that the mission was a failure and it was time for the troops to come home. Without a significant event to trigger a change in policy, the US would most likely have become bogged down in Somalia, unable to justify pulling out with the mission still incomplete.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Media attention is like a double edged sword, it can both help and hinder an ongoing operation if decision makers do not take reporters seriously and learn how to deal with them in the proper manner. Ideally, you want the media on your side, telling your story the way you want, to whom you want, when you want. If reporters are treated with respect and allowed access to the information a unit commander can provide, they are less likely to seek out their own stories, which could possibly be damaging to the mission or public support. Left to their own devices, reporters will look for an angle that

will grab audience attention and sell papers, without concern for the effects negative stories will have in the long run. If the media is given free reign to report suspicions or unflattering stories to the public, they can end up influencing or even dictating military and government policy actions, when those actions may not be in the best interests of the component commander or the United States as a whole.

Cooperation with the media on the part of the Officer in Charge of the operation will help greatly in accomplishing this. Arranging press conferences, cultivating positive relationships with news professionals and granting interviews to journalists upon request can all help to gain trust and get the media on your side. Public Affairs Officers are trained to deal with the media and function well in this role, but there is no guarantee that a PAO will always be available when such a situation arises. Consequently, media studies and public relations training need to be a part of the basic officer training courses for all branches of the United States Military. Knowing what to say and how to say it is instrumental in determining the way the media frame the story, and how the public see it. With formalized training, military officers will be better prepared to deal with media presence in any situation and will help the operation by preprocessing information for the media and thus exerting some control over the message that gets out to the general public.

In addition to working with the media during an operation to ensure stories reflect official positions and policies, government and military decision makers must engage in better preparation of the public before an operation begins. Public opinion during the US intervention in Somalia took a downward turn when the mission changed from one of humanitarian relief to a police action rounding up roving bands of militia and finally a manhunt. This was due to the fact that Operation Restore Hope was originally conceived and publicized as a short term emergency relief mission. The public received this message and accepted it, believing that US troops would deliver some supplies and return home in a few months. When those few months passed and US Special Forces were still in-country and engaged in gun battles and ambushes, the public responded by becoming less supportive of the effort. If the public had been properly prepared for the eventual character of the mission at the outset, public opinion would have been more likely to have remained in favor of the intervention, allowing US troops to complete their

mission successfully rather than being pulled out in response to the Blackhawk Down incident on 03 October 1993.

D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In preparation for training officials to deal more effectively with the media, research can be focused on developing lesson plans for courses in media studies and influence for government officials and for military officers. Additionally, a closer study of television news coverage and a review of media on the Internet would help to create a more complete picture of media influences on the public in the 21st Century. Technological advances in all areas allow the public more immediate access to news and information, adding a new dimension to the question of media influence.

APPENDIX A – NEWSPAPER ARTICLES SELECTED

All articles are from the Los Angeles times and were accessed through the Lexis-Nexis database on-line at the following address: <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>. The following list is in ascending order by date.

Article 1. **DATE:** December 6, 1992, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 19; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 865 words
HEADLINE: RELIEF WORKERS LOOK TO SOMALIA'S FUTURE;
MISSION: AID AGENCIES HOPE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
WILL HELP REBUILD NATION.
BYLINE: By EDWIN CHEN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 2. **DATE:** December 7, 1992, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 875 words
HEADLINE: AID CONVOY ENDS SOMALIA STANDOFF;
RELIEF: TRUCKS LADEN WITH FOOD ARE THE FIRST TO MAKE
IT OUT OF THE CAPITAL'S PORT IN A MONTH. MILITIAS THAT
HAD BARRED THE WAY CAPITULATE AS MARINES MASS
OFFSHORE.
BYLINE: By SCOTT PETERSON, SPECIAL TO THE TIMES
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 3. **DATE:** December 9, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 2569 words
HEADLINE: MARINES GO ASHORE IN SOMALIA;
TROOPS UNOPPOSED IN MISSION TO AID STARVING;
FAMINE: FORCES SECURE THE AIRFIELD AND PORT IN THE
CAPITAL OF MOGADISHU. TV CREWS WAIT FOR ARRIVAL AND
LIGHT UP MARINES. SOME SOMALIS APPEAR TO SURRENDER
AND ARE TURNED OVER TO U.N. PEACEKEEPERS.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN and SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF
WRITERS
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 4. **DATE:** December 10, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 13; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 865 words
HEADLINE: TV'S BRIGHT LIGHTS TURN OFF PENTAGON CHIEFS;
MEDIA: BROADCASTERS AND MILITARY LEADERS TRADE ANGRY WORDS OVER SPECTACLE AS TROOPS HIT BEACH.
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 5. **DATE:** December 10, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 728 words
HEADLINE: READY FOR WORST -- BUT IT'S NOT BEIRUT;
RECEPTION: 'THEY'RE SO FRIENDLY,' PENDLETON MARINE SAYS OF WARM WELCOME FROM SOMALIS IN THE CAPITAL.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 6. **DATE:** December 10, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1923 words
HEADLINE: MARINES REOPEN AIRPORT TO AID; SOMALIS CHEER 1ST RELIEF FLIGHT;
FAMINE: PATROLS RETAKE LOOTED U.S. EMBASSY AND STAGE SHOW OF FORCE TO DETER ANY OPPOSITION. THOUSANDS POUR INTO STREETS FREED OF GUNS.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT and MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITERS
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 7. **DATE:** December 10, 1992, Thursday, San Diego County Edition
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 1; Column 5; Metro Desk
LENGTH: 680 words
HEADLINE: MARINES LEAVE TO KEEP SOMALIAN MISSION SUPPLIED;
LOGISTICS: HUMANITARIAN NATURE OF OPERATION HELPS TROOPS AND FAMILIES DEAL WITH THE DEPLOYMENT FAREWELLS.
BYLINE: By RAY TESSLER and LEE ROMNEY, TIMES STAFF WRITERS

Article 8. **DATE:** December 12, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 15; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 977 words
HEADLINE: U.N. CHIEF WANTS U.S. TO DISARM SOMALIS;
GOALS: HE SAYS OFFICIALS RAISED NO OBJECTION TO HIS
REQUEST THAT MISSION GO BEYOND FAMINE RELIEF.
BYLINE: By STANLEY MEISLER and NORMAN KEMPSTER, TIMES
STAFF WRITERS
DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS

Article 9. **DATE:** December 12, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 649 words
HEADLINE: GUNPLAY MAY BE ENDING ON GREEN LINE;
SOMALIA: A SYMBOL OF BANDITRY DIVIDING THE CAPITAL IS
ERASED BY A PACT BETWEEN WARRING CLANS.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 10. **DATE:** December 12, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1146 words
HEADLINE: MOGADISHU'S WARLORDS ANNOUNCE PEACE
PACT;
ACCORD: SOMALI CLANS AGREE TO PUT AN IMMEDIATE END
TO FIGHTING IN THE CAPITAL. BUT VIOLENCE INLAND
CONTINUES.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN and SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF
WRITERS
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 11. **DATE:** December 14, 1992, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1284 words
HEADLINE: U.S. TROOPS MOVE INLAND IN SOMALIA;
RELIEF: TAKEOVER OF DESERTED AIRSTRIP MARKS FIRST
MAJOR FORAY INTO COUNTRY'S CENTRAL REGION. HELP IS
ONE STEP CLOSER TO AID WORKERS IN BAIDOA.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: BELA DOGLE, Somalia

Article 12. **DATE:** December 15, 1992, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: World Report; Page 5; World Report
LENGTH: 917 words
HEADLINE: DOCUMENTARY;
STORMING THE BEACH -- AND MEETING THE PRESS;
THE MARINES' FIRST ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA WAS WITH
THE MEDIA. FORTUNATELY, THE ONLY CASUALTIES WERE
DIGNITY, DECORUM AND NERVES.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 13. **DATE:** December 15, 1992, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 18; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1046 words
HEADLINE: AMID QUESTIONS ABOUT DELAY, TROOPS
PREPARE TO FAN OUT FROM SOMALI CAPITAL;
RELIEF: DEBATE OVER PRECISE ROLE OF U.S.-LED OPERATION
SPARKS RENEWED ANXIETY ON MOGADISHU'S STREETS.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 14. **DATE:** December 16, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 6; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1037 words
HEADLINE: STARVING SOMALIS TOO WEAK TO TEND CROPS
AS HARVEST NEARS;
FAMINE: TROOPS' ARRIVAL MAY BE TOO LATE FOR REMOTE
REGIONS PILLAGED BY ARMED BANDS, ISOLATED BY LAND
MINES.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 15. **DATE:** December 16, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1623 words
HEADLINE: U.S.-LED CONVOY REACHES BAIDOA, CENTER OF
FAMINE;
SOMALIA: THE HEAVILY ARMED TROOPS MEET LITTLE
RESISTANCE AS THEY ENTER THE CITY, WHERE 60 PEOPLE
HAVE BEEN DYING EACH DAY AMID ATTACKS ON RELIEF
OFFICIALS.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT and MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF
WRITERS
DATELINE: BAIDOA, Somalia

Article 16. **DATE:** December 17, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1107 words
HEADLINE: TROOPS CARRY PRECIOUS GIFT: PEACE OF MIND
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: BAIDOA, Somalia

Article 17. **DATE:** December 17, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1126 words
HEADLINE: SOMALI PERIL NOT OVER, U.S. SAYS;
FAMINE: TROOPS SECURE BAIDOA, BUT SPECIAL ENVOY
OAKLEY CITES AREAS THAT ARE EVEN MORE TENSE. U.N.
TRUCKS WILL COMPETE WITH COSTLY LOCAL SHIPPING
CARTEL.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN and SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF
WRITERS
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 18. **DATE:** December 18, 1992, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1079 words
HEADLINE: FOOD CONVOYS REACHING REMOTE HUNGER
ZONES;
SOMALIA: OPERATION RESTORE HOPE IS DAYS AHEAD OF
SCHEDULE, U.S. OFFICERS SAY.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 19. **DATE:** December 18, 1992, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 809 words
HEADLINE: SOMALIA CAN BE SCARIER THAN IRAQI SCUDS,
SOME GULF VETS SAY
BYLINE: By RAY TESSLER, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 20. **DATE:** December 19, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 16; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1445 words
HEADLINE: U.S., FOREIGN FORCES BACK EACH OTHER UP;
SOMALIA: THE LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
VOLUNTEERING TO SEND FORCES HAS TAKEN AMERICAN
COMMANDERS BY SURPRISE.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT and MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF
WRITERS
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 21. **DATE:** December 19, 1992, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1108 words
HEADLINE: SOME GIS MAY EXIT SOMALIA IN JANUARY;
FAMINE: WITH OPERATION GOING SMOOTHLY AND FOREIGN
TROOPS FLOCKING IN, U.S. COMMANDER SAYS COMBAT UNITS
MAY GO HOME EARLY, BE REPLACED BY SUPPORT
PERSONNEL.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 22. **DATE:** December 21, 1992, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1142 words
HEADLINE: WARLORD GETS WARNING AS MARINES ARRIVE
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: KISMAYU, Somalia

Article 23. **DATE:** December 22, 1992, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1390 words
HEADLINE: SOMALI WARLORDS AGREE TO ARMS CUT;
SECURITY: DOZENS OF GUN-BEARING VEHICLES ARE TO BE
TAKEN OFF THE CAPITAL'S STREETS. IF THE THREAT TO
MARINES IS NOT REMOVED, THE VEHICLES WILL BE
DESTROYED.
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 24. **DATE:** December 23, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 3; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1153 words
HEADLINE: SOMALIA EFFORT AHEAD OF GOALS; BUSH WILL VISIT
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 25. **DATE:** December 24, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 8; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 728 words
HEADLINE: NEWS ANALYSIS;
MARINES' NEW SLOGAN: 'THE FIRST TO HELP OUT';
MILITARY: HUMANITARIAN MISSION IN SOMALIA HIGHLIGHTS THE SHIFT AWAY FROM TRADITIONAL ROLE AS THE 'FIRST TO FIGHT.'
BYLINE: By H. G. REZA, TIMES STAFF WRITER

Article 26. **DATE:** December 24, 1992, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 810 words
HEADLINE: AMERICAN KILLED, 3 HURT BY SOMALIA LAND MINE;
FAMINE: THE FOUR CIVILIANS RIDING IN A CAR WERE AN ADVANCE TEAM FOR FRIDAY'S MARINE THRUST INTO BARDERA.
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 27. **DATE:** December 25, 1992, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1267 words
HEADLINE: U.S. INSISTS ON CONTROL OF ITS TROOPS
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 28. **DATE:** December 29, 1992, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 929 words
HEADLINE: SOMALI CIVIL WAR IS OVER, RIVALS VOW;
PEACE: CLAN LEADERS EMBRACE IN PUBLIC AND THOUSANDS CHEER. BUT VIOLENCE CONTINUES, AND CLASHES WITH U.S. TROOPS RESULT IN AT LEAST ONE SOMALI DEATH.
BYLINE: By KENNETH FREED, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 29. **DATE:** December 30, 1992, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 470 words
HEADLINE: MARINES GETTING TOUGH IN SOMALI CAPITAL AS BUSH VISIT IS AWAITED
BYLINE: From Associated Press
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 30. **DATE:** January 1, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1344 words
HEADLINE: BUSH HAILS TROOPS FOR AIDING SOMALIS; AFRICA: PRESIDENT VISITS FORCES, CLINIC, IS GREETED BY MOGADISHU-AREA RESIDENTS. BUT A NIGHTTIME ARTILLERY DUEL BETWEEN CLANS UNDERSCORES ISSUE OF DISARMING MILITIAS.
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 31. **DATE:** January 2, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 20; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 527 words
HEADLINE: BUSH TELLS TROOPS, 'WE ARE VERY, VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU'
BYLINE: From Associated Press
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 32. **DATE:** January 2, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1442 words
HEADLINE: BATTLES RAGE AS BUSH ENDS SOMALI TRIP; AFRICA: WHILE PRESIDENT VISITS ORPHANAGE AND PRAISES TROOPS' MERCY MISSION, FIGHTING FLARES IN RAVAGED COUNTRY. THE CLAN WARFARE LEAVES 17 SOMALIS DEAD ON ONE SIDE ALONE.
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 33. **DATE:** January 5, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 9; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 754 words
HEADLINE: SOMALI HOSTILITY AIMED AT U.S. TROOPS RANDOM BUT BECOMING COMMONPLACE
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 34. **DATE:** January 7, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 9; Column 3; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 201 words
HEADLINE: U.S. HELICOPTERS ATTACK SITE HELD BY SOMALI WARLORD
BYLINE: From Times Wire Services
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 35. **DATE:** January 7, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 796 words
HEADLINE: MOST U.S. FORCES TO END SOMALIA DUTY BY MARCH 1
BYLINE: By ROBIN WRIGHT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 36. **DATE:** January 9, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 8; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 799 words
HEADLINE: U.S. TROOPS SIGNAL INTENT TO TAKE GUNS FROM SOMALIS;
AFRICA: RAID ON MOGADISHU ARMS MARKET REFLECTS SHIFTING ROLE. FACTION LEADERS AGREE ON MARCH PEACE CONFERENCE.
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 37. **DATE:** January 9, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 6; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1458 words
HEADLINE: IN CHAOTIC KISMAYU, U.S. ASPIRATIONS COME FACE TO FACE WITH REALITY;
SOMALIA: THE EFFORT TO CREATE A STABLE ENVIRONMENT OUT OF A VOLATILE SITUATION HAS MET WITH ONLY PARTIAL SUCCESS.
BYLINE: By DANIEL WILLIAMS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: KISMAYU, Somalia

Article 38. **DATE:** January 13, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 681 words
HEADLINE: MARINES SUFFER 1ST FATALITY ON SOMALIA MISSION
BYLINE: By MELISSA HEALY, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 39. **DATE:** January 14, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 971 words
HEADLINE: MARINE'S KILLING LEAVES COMRADES ANGRY, WORRIED
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 40. **DATE:** January 16, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1334 words
HEADLINE: SOMALIA MOSTLY STABLE, GENERAL SAYS; RELIEF: U.S. COMMANDER SAYS MOST OF FAMINE ZONE IS UNDER CONTROL AND READY TO BE TURNED OVER TO U.N.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 41. **DATE:** January 17, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 684 words
HEADLINE: U.S. SOLDIERS SURPRISE ROBBERS, KILL 6 SOMALIS; AFRICA: THREE OF DEAD ARE KNOWN TO BE VICTIMS OF ROBBERY, MARKING AT LEAST SECOND TIME AMERICAN FORCES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED KILLING UNARMED CIVILIANS.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 42. **DATE:** January 18, 1993, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 13; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 791 words
HEADLINE: MARINE CONTINGENT TO LEAVE SOMALIA THIS WEEK
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 43. **DATE:** January 19, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: World Report; Page 1; Column 2; World Report
LENGTH: 1441 words
HEADLINE: NATIONAL AGENDA;
SUSPICIOUS OF U.N., SOMALIS DESPAIR OVER REBUILDING;
MANY DREAD THE DEPARTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY
COMMAND, WHICH THEY SEE AS KEY TO CONTAINING CHAOS.
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 44. **DATE:** January 20, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 3; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1004 words
HEADLINE: PULLOUT OF U.S. TROOPS FROM SOMALIA BEGINS
BYLINE: By SCOTT KRAFT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 45. **DATE:** January 21, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 3; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 255 words
HEADLINE: MARINE WOUNDED IN SOMALIA; HUNDREDS OF
U.S. TROOPS LEAVE
BYLINE: From Associated Press
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 46. **DATE:** January 22, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 15; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 481 words
HEADLINE: DELAY POSSIBLE IN U.S. PULLOUT FROM
SOMALIA;
AFRICA: NO TIMETABLE CAN BE SET UNTIL THE SECURITY
COUNCIL TRANSFERS CONTROL OF THE U.S.-LED OPERATION
TO A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
BYLINE: From Associated Press
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 47. **DATE:** January 26, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 4; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 779 words
HEADLINE: U.S. FORCES DESTROY ARMS, VEHICLES OF SOMALI WARLORD;
AFRICA: AMERICANS SAY THEY INTERVENED JUST TO ENFORCE CEASE-FIRE. RED CROSS OFFICE IS SHELLED IN KISMAYU.
BYLINE: By JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 48. **DATE:** January 26, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 69 words
HEADLINE: MARINE KILLED ON PATROL IN SOMALIA
BYLINE: By Associated Press
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 49. **DATE:** January 29, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 5; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 850 words
HEADLINE: MILITARY;
HEAVY DUTY IN SOMALIA: FEEDING HUNGRY TROOPS;
THE RANGE OF U.S.-PROVIDED GOODS AND SERVICES FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE SEEMS ENDLESS.
BYLINE: By JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 50. **DATE:** February 6, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 14; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 727 words
HEADLINE: SOMALIS HURL ROCKS AT U.S. TROOPS;
AFRICA: THE CROWD MISTAKENLY THOUGHT MARINES HAD SHOT 6 CITIZENS IN CAPITAL. INCIDENT UNDERSCORES TENSIONS.
BYLINE: By JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 51. **DATE:** February 7, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 561 words
HEADLINE: SOMALI FACTIONS BATTLE IN MOGADISHU; AFRICA: MARINES POSITION THEMSELVES IN MIDDLE OF RIVAL CLANS TO DEFUSE CONFLICT BUT SUFFER NO CASUALTIES.
BYLINE: From Times Wire Services
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 52. **DATE:** February 14, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 275 words
HEADLINE: COMMAND IN SOMALIA MAY PASS TO U.N. WITHIN WEEKS
BYLINE: From Associated Press
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 53. **DATE:** February 24, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 4; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 314 words
HEADLINE: WARLORD GETS WARNING: LEAVE SOMALIA PORT
BYLINE: From Associated Press
DATELINE: KISMAYU, Somalia

Article 54. **DATE:** February 25, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 716 words
HEADLINE: RAMPAGING SOMALI YOUTHS ATTACK COALITION TROOPS; AFRICA: TWO EMBASSIES IN MOGADISHU ARE ASSAULTED IN THE WORST UNREST SINCE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES.
BYLINE: From Times Wire Services
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 55. **DATE:** February 26, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 3; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 531 words
HEADLINE: 3 MARINES HURT IN CLASH WITH SOMALI SNIPERS
BYLINE: From Associated Press
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 56. **DATE:** February 28, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1284 words
HEADLINE: STREET BATTLES LEAVE SOMALIS, AID WORKERS SHAKEN, TENSE
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 57. **DATE:** March 1, 1993, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1657 words
HEADLINE: IN SOMALIA, MARINES FEEL THE LOSS OF A WELCOME MAT;
MERCY MISSION: IN WAKE OF ANTI-AMERICAN RIOTING, WEARY U.S. TROOPS SAY IT'S TIME TO GO HOME.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 58. **DATE:** March 3, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 983 words
HEADLINE: U.S. ENVOY SEES SUCCESS IN TOP GOAL IN SOMALIA;
AFRICA: MASS DEATHS FROM FAMINE AND DISEASE HAVE ENDED, OAKLEY TELLS TROOPS AS HE ENDS HIS 3-MONTH TOUR.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 59. **DATE:** March 5, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 13; Column 3; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 539 words
HEADLINE: U.N. CHIEF FAULTS SECURITY IN SOMALIA;
AFRICA: BOUTROS-GHALI PROPOSES FIELDING A FORCE OF 28,000 TO TAKE OVER FROM U.S.-LED TROOPS.
BYLINE: By STANLEY MEISLER, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS

Article 60. **DATE:** March 5, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1256 words
HEADLINE: USE OF FORCE AT ISSUE IN A LAND OF ANARCHY; SOMALIA: THE OUTCOME COULD AFFECT MARINE'S CAREER AND SET PRECEDENTS FOR U.S. TROOPS.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 61. **DATE:** March 6, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 5; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1101 words
HEADLINE: MARINE OFFERS CHILLING TESTIMONY IN SHOOTING OF SOMALI; AFRICA: CAMP PENDLETON RADAR TECHNICIAN SAYS HE FIRED IN SELF-DEFENSE. CASE IS SEEN AS A TEST OF THE SOMETIMES PUZZLING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 62. **DATE:** March 9, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; Column 1; Metro Desk
LENGTH: 786 words
HEADLINE: COLUMN LEFT/ ALEXANDER COCKBURN; BAD IDEA FROM THE START; IN TERMS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILIZATION FOR SOMALIA, 'RESTORE HOPE' HAS FAILED.
BYLINE: By ALEXANDER COCKBURN, Alexander Cockburn writes for the Nation and other publications.

Article 63. **DATE:** March 26, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 27; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 315 words
HEADLINE: U.S. SENDS MARINES TO KISMAYU IN NEW EFFORT TO CURB WARLORDS
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 64. **DATE:** March 27, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 580 words
HEADLINE: U.N. APPROVES LARGE FORCE FOR SOMALIA; PEACEKEEPING: IT WILL TAKE OVER FROM U.S.-LED TROOPS MAY 1 AND SEEK TO DISARM FACTIONS, HELP REBUILD RAVAGED NATION.
BYLINE: From Associated Press
DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS

Article 65. **DATE:** April 9, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 6; Column 1; Metro Desk
LENGTH: 529 words
HEADLINE: U.S. PREPARES TO PASS THE TORCH IN SOMALIA; AFTER A GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL RELIEF EFFORT, U.N. WILL TAKE OVER

Article 66. **DATE:** April 29, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 918 words
HEADLINE: U.S. TROOPS HAND OFF LAST SOMALI AREA TO U.N. FORCES
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MARKA, Somalia

Article 67. **DATE:** May 5, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1638 words
HEADLINE: SOMALIA ROLE ASSESSED AS U.S. FLAG IS LOWERED
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 68. **DATE:** May 5, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 6; Column 1; Metro Desk
LENGTH: 429 words
HEADLINE: HUMANITARIANISM REDEFINED; SOMALIA: BETTER BECAUSE OF THE U.S.

Article 69. **DATE:** May 6, 1993, Thursday, Orange County Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Metro Desk
LENGTH: 1143 words
HEADLINE: MARINES BACK FROM SOMALIA;
HOMECOMING: HEAD OF U.S.-LED FORCE AND STAFF RETURN
TO EL TORO WITH SATISFACTION OF SUCCESSFUL MISSION OF
MERCY.
BYLINE: By KEVIN JOHNSON and OTTO STRONG, TIMES STAFF
WRITERS
DATELINE: EL TORO MARINE BASE

Article 70. **DATE:** June 27, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Magazine; Page 20; Magazine Desk
LENGTH: 4310 words
HEADLINE: SOLDIERS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER;
AGGRESSIVE PEACEMAKERS, U.S. MARINES DRAW DOWN THE
WARLORDS OF SOMALIA AND WRITE A MILITARY BLUEPRINT
FOR FUTURE CAMPAIGNS
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, Mark Fineman, The Times Nicosia
bureau chief, covers the Middle East. His last article for this magazine was
The Wrath of Rama.

Article 71. **DATE:** August 29, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 2; Column 1; Opinion Desk
LENGTH: 1346 words
HEADLINE: AN ADVENTURE WITH ALL THE EARMARKS OF
DOOM;
SOMALIA: DISPATCHING ELITE TROOPS WILL LOCK IN THE
MISSION'S BIG-POWER PROFILE, MAKING A SOLUTION MORE
ELUSIVE. FOUR WAYS TO WITHDRAW GRACEFULLY.
BYLINE: By John M. Broder and Robin Wright, John M. Broder and
Robin Wright cover national-security affairs for The Times.
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 72. **DATE:** August 31, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1054 words
HEADLINE: U.N. STILL HAVING 'BAD LUCK' IN SOMALIA;
AFRICA: OFF-TARGET COMMANDO RAID IS ONE OF A SERIES
OF EMBARRASSMENTS AFFLICTING ALLIED MILITARY
OPERATIONS. AND WARLORD AIDID IS STILL ON THE LOOSE.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 73. **DATE:** September 26, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 853 words
HEADLINE: U.S. DENOUNCES ATTACK, REAFFIRMS SOMALIA MISSION;
POLICY: THE ADMINISTRATION VOWS NOT TO GIVE IN TO 'BRUTALITY OF WARLORDS' AFTER THREE AMERICANS DIE WHEN A HELICOPTER IS SHOT DOWN IN MOGADISHU.
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 74. **DATE:** September 27, 1993, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 373 words
HEADLINE: NUNN CRITICIZES U.N. HUNT FOR SOMALI WARLORD AIDID
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 75. **DATE:** September 29, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 975 words
HEADLINE: CLINTON WANTS DATE SET FOR GIS TO PULL OUT OF SOMALIA
BYLINE: By DOYLE McMANUS and STANLEY MEISLER, TIMES STAFF WRITERS
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 76. **DATE:** September 29, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 6; Column 1; Metro Desk
LENGTH: 454 words
HEADLINE: SOMALIA: STAY THERE FOREVER?; U.N. AND AFRICAN NATIONS MUST TAKE THE LEAD

Article 77. **DATE:** October 4, 1993, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 878 words
HEADLINE: 5 U.S. SOLDIERS KILLED, 24 HURT IN SOMALI SWEEP
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 78. **DATE:** October 5, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1196 words
HEADLINE: U.S. BOOSTS SOMALIA TROOPS AFTER 12 DIE; AFRICA: CASUALTY FIGURES MORE THAN DOUBLE; SIX ARE HELD HOSTAGE. DEADLY INCIDENT THREATENS CLINTON POLICY.
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 79. **DATE:** October 6, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 6; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 798 words
HEADLINE: WARLORD AIDID'S FORCES BETTER AT FIGHTING NOW; FOES: MILITIAMEN ARE MORE ORGANIZED THAN WHEN U.N. TOOK OVER MISSION. THEY CAN ALSO DOWN HELICOPTERS.
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 80. **DATE:** October 6, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 961 words
HEADLINE: ANGRY LAWMAKERS THREATEN TO PUSH FOR SOMALIA PULLOUT; AFRICA: AFTER MEETING WITH ASPIN AND CHRISTOPHER, MEMBERS OF BOTH PARTIES WARN THEY MAY CUT FUNDS. CLINTON CONFERS WITH HIS TOP SECURITY ADVISERS.
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS and ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITERS

Article 81. **DATE:** October 6, 1993, Wednesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 6; Column 3; Metro Desk
LENGTH: 327 words
HEADLINE: THAT MESS IN SOMALIA

Article 82. **DATE:** October 7, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1989 words
HEADLINE: CLINTON TO SEND 2,000 MORE GIS TO SOMALIA;
AFRICA: ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL EXPECTS PULLOUT
WITHIN SIX MONTHS. CARTER TO LEAD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO END FACTIONAL FIGHTING.
BYLINE: By JOHN M. BRODER and ART PINE, TIMES STAFF
WRITERS
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 83. **DATE:** October 8, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1496 words
HEADLINE: 2 MISSIONS IN CLINTON'S APPROACH;
FORCE: NEW DEPLOYMENT IS DESIGNED TO LAY POLITICAL
SOLUTION BEFORE GUERRILLAS AND TO PROTECT AMERICAN
TROOPS IN SOMALIA.
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 84. **DATE:** October 8, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 12; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 468 words
HEADLINE: POLICY APPEARS TO QUELL REVOLT IN CONGRESS
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 85. **DATE:** October 8, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1491 words
HEADLINE: CLINTON ORDERS 5,300 TROOPS TO SOMALIA,
SETS MARCH 31 PULLOUT;
AFRICA: DEPLOYMENT IS 'TO PROTECT OUR TROOPS AND TO
COMPLETE OUR MISSION,' PRESIDENT SAYS, REJECTING CALLS
TO 'CUT AND RUN.' HE SENDS 1,700 SOLDIERS, PLUS 3,600
MARINES TO BE STATIONED OFFSHORE.
BYLINE: By JOHN M. BRODER, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 86. **DATE:** October 8, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1060 words
HEADLINE: 'EXIT STRATEGY' FOR SOMALIA PLOWS NEW MILITARY GROUND;
POLICY: SIX-MONTH DEADLINE PRAISED AS RECOGNITION OF LIMITED U.S. STAKE. BUT FOES COULD WAIT OUT DEPARTURE.
BYLINE: By DOYLE McMANUS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 87. **DATE:** October 9, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1379 words
HEADLINE: FATAL CLASHES IN SOMALIA PUT U.N. PEACEKEEPING ROLE IN DOUBT;
MILITARY: ATTACK ON U.S. RANGERS CASTS CLOUD OVER HOPES OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES COOPERATING TO QUELL GLOBAL CONFLICTS.
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 88. **DATE:** October 9, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1349 words
HEADLINE: U.S., IN SHIFT ON SOMALIA, TO PURSUE PEACE WITH AIDID;
AFRICA: ADMINISTRATION ENVOY IS ASKING REGIONAL LEADERS FOR HELP. HUNT FOR FUGITIVE WARLORD WOULD BE SUSPENDED IF HE STOPPED ATTACKS. BODIES OF TWO MORE GIS RECOVERED.
BYLINE: By ART PINE and NORMAN KEMPSTER, TIMES STAFF WRITERS
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 89. **DATE:** October 10, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 1; Column 2; Opinion Desk
LENGTH: 1330 words
HEADLINE: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE;
IS THE PRICE IN SOMALIA TOO HIGH?
BYLINE: By CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES, Charles William Maynes is editor of Foreign Policy.
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 90. **DATE:** October 10, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Opinion; Part M; Page 5; Column 5; Op-Ed Desk
LENGTH: 744 words
HEADLINE: COLUMN RIGHT / SMITH HEMPSTONE;
WHY WAIT SIX MONTHS? THREE WOULD DO IT;
WHY EXPOSE U.S. TROOPS LONGER? THIS IS TRAGIC
SIDESHOW, NOT NATIONAL SECURITY.
BYLINE: By SMITH HEMPSTONE, Smith Hempstone, a Bush political appointee and former newspaper editor, was ambassador to Kenya, 1989-93; he now teaches at the University of the South in Sewanee, Tenn.

Article 91. **DATE:** October 11, 1993, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 954 words
HEADLINE: U.S. SEEKS TO CLARIFY AIDID POLICY;
SOMALIA: CLINTON ADMINISTRATION SAYS IT IS NO LONGER ACTIVELY SEEKING WARLORD'S ARREST BUT WOULD NOT RULE IT OUT. LEADING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE STILL DISSATISFIED.
BYLINE: By DOYLE McMANUS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 92. **DATE:** October 11, 1993, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1157 words
HEADLINE: NEWS ANALYSIS;
CLAN RIVALRIES MAY HINDER U.S. GOALS IN SOMALIA
BYLINE: By ROBIN WRIGHT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 93. **DATE:** October 14, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 6; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1014 words
HEADLINE: CLINTON GOES ON OFFENSIVE OVER SOMALIA POLICY;
AFRICA: PRESIDENT LOBBIES LAWMAKERS ON WITHDRAWAL DATE. UPHILL FIGHT PREDICTED.
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS and JOHN M. BRODER, TIMES STAFF WRITERS
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 94. **DATE:** October 15, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1460 words
HEADLINE: CLINTON TO INSIST ON U.S. CONTROL OF GIS IN U.N. ROLES
BYLINE: By DAVID LAUTER and PAUL RICHTER, TIMES STAFF WRITERS
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 95. **DATE:** October 15, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1267 words
HEADLINE: SOMALIS FREE U.S. PILOT; LAWMAKERS BACK CLINTON AIMS;
AFRICA: PRESIDENT CITES DURANT'S RELEASE AS SIGN HIS POLICY IS WORKING. AIDID SURFACES, TELLS REPORTERS IT WAS GOODWILL GESTURE. SENATORS AGREE TO ACCEPT MARCH 31 PULLOUT DATE.
BYLINE: By JOHN M. BRODER and MICHAEL ROSS, TIMES STAFF WRITERS
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 96. **DATE:** October 16, 1993, Saturday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1085 words
HEADLINE: NEWS ANALYSIS;
SOMALIA SPURS NEW ACTIVISM IN CONGRESS;
GOVERNMENT: LAWMAKERS IMPOSED THEIR WILL IN A WAY THAT COULD HERALD GREATER LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
BYLINE: By MICHAEL ROSS and KAREN TUMULTY, TIMES STAFF WRITERS
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 97. **DATE:** October 17, 1993, Sunday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 2; National Desk
LENGTH: 1620 words
HEADLINE: DEATHS IN SOMALIA SPARK FLOOD OF OPPOSITION IN U.S.
BYLINE: By SARA FRITZ, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: LOWELL, Mass.

Article 98. **DATE:** October 18, 1993, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 719 words
HEADLINE: AIDID BACKERS HOLD PEACE RALLY IN SOMALI CAPITAL;
AFRICA: THE DEMONSTRATION BY 1,000 PEOPLE IS PART OF A CAMPAIGN TO CHANGE HIS WARLORD IMAGE.
BYLINE: From Associated Press
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 99. **DATE:** October 19, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1259 words
HEADLINE: MANY IN MILITARY ANGRY OVER CLINTON'S POLICIES;
ARMED FORCES: SENIOR OFFICERS SEE A LACK OF CLEAR U.S. GOALS IN SOMALIA, HAITI -- AND A TENDENCY TO CUT AND RUN.
BYLINE: By RICHARD A. SERRANO and ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITERS
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 100. **DATE:** October 21, 1993, Thursday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1573 words
HEADLINE: RANGERS' SOMALIA MISSION MARRED BY LAPSES, ERRORS;
MILITARY: TROOPS' HIGH-PROFILE SEARCH FOR WARLORD AIDID WENT AWRY. THAT LED TO CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 101. **DATE:** October 22, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 16; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 641 words
HEADLINE: AIDID HUNT WAS 'GROSS MISCALCULATION,' U.S. GENERAL SAYS;
SOMALIA: WARLORD'S CLAN WOULD 'FIGHT YOU TO THE DEATH,' JOHNSTON TELLS LAWMAKERS. HE ENDORSES REVISED AMERICAN POLICY.
BYLINE: By ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 102. **DATE:** October 25, 1993, Monday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 4; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1160 words
HEADLINE: SOMALIS FEAR NEW DISASTER AFTER U.S. TROOPS PULL OUT;
AFRICA: MARCH DATE IS TOO EARLY, THEY INSIST. CITIZENS BECOMING DESPERATE AS MORE BLOODSHED, FAMINE LOOM.
BYLINE: By MARK FINEMAN, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: MOGADISHU, Somalia

Article 103. **DATE:** November 2, 1993, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: World Report; Page 5; Column 1; World Report
LENGTH: 736 words
HEADLINE: AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE: DIVIDED WE STAND; THE PUBLIC;
AMERICANS VIEW TROOP DEPLOYMENTS CAUTIOUSLY;
* A MAJORITY THINK FAMINE RELIEF WARRANTS DISPATCHING SOLDIERS ABROAD. BUT THEY DRAW THE LINE AT SUCH TASKS AS RESTORING LAW AND ORDER.
BYLINE: By Doyle McManus
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 104. **DATE:** November 5, 1993, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 1; Column 4; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 656 words
HEADLINE: REINFORCED U.S. TROOPS RESUME SOMALIA PATROLS
BYLINE: By RICHARD A. SERRANO, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 105. **DATE:** March 4, 1994, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Part A; Page 16; Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1058 words
HEADLINE: SOMALIA CASTS SHADOW ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY;
AFRICA: ANALYSTS SAY THE MISSION MAY PROVE AN EXCEPTION TO THE PATTERN OF U.S. ACTION ABROAD.
BYLINE: By ROBIN WRIGHT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: WASHINGTON

Article 106. **DATE:** April 1, 1994, Friday, Home Edition
SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; Column 1; Metro Desk
LENGTH: 777 words
HEADLINE: PAYING THE PRICE OF DOING 'GOD'S WORK';
SOMALIA: UNWILLING TO RISK U.S. LIVES, WE STRETCHED
THE RULES AND SOMALIS DIED.
BYLINE: By A. J. BACEVICH, A.J. Bacevich is executive director of the
Foreign Policy Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies in Washington.

APPENDIX B – OPINION POLLS SELECTED

All polls were accessed on-line through the Lexis-Nexis Database at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>. The following list is divided into groups by subject (mission approval, mission goals, overall importance, US involvement, pullout conditions, and if the mission was worth it) and in ascending order by date within each group.

Poll 1. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of President Bush's plan to send American military forces to assure distribution relief supplies in the African nation of Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 66%
Disapprove	- 24
Don't know/Refused	- 11

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP

ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 602

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Newsweek

BEGINNING DATE: December 3, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 4, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP, NEWSWEEK

Poll 2. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of the decision to send U.S. (United States) armed forces into the African nation of Somalia as part of a United Nations effort to deliver relief supplies there? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve - 74%
Disapprove - 21
No opinion - 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP

ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,005

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 4, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 3. **QUESTION:** Do you favor or oppose sending 28,000 American troops to Somalia to help distribute food and medicine? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Favor - 75%
Oppose - 20
Not sure/Refused - 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: LOUIS

HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,254

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 4, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 8, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: HARRIS POLL

Poll 4. **QUESTION:** Do you think the United States should be sending U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia to try and make sure shipments of food get through to the people there, or should U.S. troops stay out? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Should be sending troops	- 72%
Should stay out	- 16
Don't know/No answer	- 12

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 835

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 6, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 5. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush has been handling the situation in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 73%
Disapprove	- 19
Don't know/No answer	- 8

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,333

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 7, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 9, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

Poll 6. **QUESTION:** Do you think the United States is doing the right thing to send U.S. troops to Somalia to try and make sure shipments of food get through to the people there, or should U.S. troops have stayed out? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Right thing	- 81%
Should have stayed out	- 14
Don't know/No answer	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,333

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 7, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 9, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

Poll 7. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of (President George) Bush's decision to send U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 76%
Disapprove	- 21
Don't know/No opinion	- 3

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS, WASHINGTON POST

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,011

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 11, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 14, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS, WASHINGTON POST

Poll 8. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of (George) Bush's decision to send U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 80%
Disapprove	- 16
Don't know/No opinion	- 4

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 513

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: January 13, 1993

ENDING DATE: January 13, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 9. **QUESTION:** Do you think the United States is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to help the U.N. (United Nations) solve the problems in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Good	- 77%
Poor	- 18
Don't know	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: MARKET STRATEGIES AND GREENBERG RESEARCH

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,020

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Americans Talk Issues Found. & the W. Alton Jones Found.

BEGINNING DATE: March 23, 1993

ENDING DATE: April 4, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: AMERICANS TALK ISSUES#21-- GLOBAL UNCERTAINTIES

Poll 10. **QUESTION:** Last week (June, 1993), the United States participated in a military operation with the United Nations against one of the warlords in Somalia. Do you generally approve or disapprove of that decision? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 65%
Disapprove	- 23
No opinion	- 12

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP
ORGANIZATION
POPULATION: National adult
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,003
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone
BEGINNING DATE: June 18, 1993
ENDING DATE: June 21, 1993
SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 11. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 51%
Disapprove	- 21
Don't know/No answer	- 27

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES
POPULATION: National adult
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,363
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone
SURVEY NOTES: 622 respondents were reinterviewed on 6/27/93 after the missile attack on Baghdad, Iraq (June 26, 1993). Those results are shown separately.
BEGINNING DATE: June 21, 1993
ENDING DATE: June 24, 1993
SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

Poll 12. **QUESTION:**
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? (If Depends probe once with:) Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?

Mission approval

RESULTS:
Approve - 41%
Disapprove - 39
Don't know/Refused - 19

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PRINCETON

SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 2,000

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Times Mirror

BEGINNING DATE: September 9, 1993

ENDING DATE: September 15, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: INTERNATIONAL POLICY
OPINION SURVEY

Poll 13. **QUESTION:**
In general, do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia?

Mission approval

RESULTS:
Approve - 43%
Disapprove - 46
Not sure - 11

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 800

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network

BEGINNING DATE: September 23, 1993

ENDING DATE: September 23, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: TIME, C.N.N., YANKELOVICH
PARTNERS INC.

Poll 14. **QUESTION:**
President (Bill) Clinton has ordered several hundred more American troops and some armored vehicles into Somalia to deal with the military situation there. Do you approve or disapprove of that decision? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 38%
Disapprove	- 57
Don't know/Refused	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP
ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 525

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Cable News Network, U.S.A. Today

BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP, C.N.N., U.S.A. TODAY

Poll 15. **QUESTION:**
Looking back, do you approve or disapprove of (President) George Bush's decision to send U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia last December (1992)? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 56%
Disapprove	- 38
Don't know/No opinion	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the evening news programs aired in each time zone.

BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 16. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve - 33%
Disapprove - 53
No opinion - 14

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the evening news programs aired in each time zone.

BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 17. **QUESTION:** Do you think the United States did the right thing to send U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia last December (1992) to try to make sure shipments of food got through to the people there, or should the U.S. troops have stayed out? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Right thing - 63%
Stayed out - 33
Don't know/No answer - 4

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 18. **QUESTION:**
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 26%
Disapprove	- 56
Don't know/No answer	- 18

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 19. **QUESTION:**
Do you think the United States did the right thing to send U.S. troops to Somalia last December (1992) to try and make sure shipments of food got through to the people there, or should the U.S. troops have stayed out? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Right thing	- 64%
Stayed out	- 32
Don't know/No answer	- 4

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 530

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 20. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 21%
Disapprove	- 58
Don't know/No answer	- 21

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 530

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 21. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of (President Bill) Clinton's decision to withdraw all U.S. (United States) troops except for some support personnel from Somalia by March 31 (1994)? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 70%
Disapprove	- 27
Don't know/No opinion	- 3

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

WASHINGTON POST

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,015

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: WASHINGTON POST

Poll 22. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of (President Bill) Clinton's decision to send additional military troops to Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 44%
Disapprove	- 53
Don't know/No opinion	- 3

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

WASHINGTON POST

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,015

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: WASHINGTON POST

Poll 23. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 36%
Disapprove	- 52
No opinion	- 12

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 24. **QUESTION:**
Do you approve or disapprove of his (President Bill Clinton's) decision to set a March 31 (1994) withdrawal date (for U.S. troops in Somalia)? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve - 45%
Disapprove - 49
No opinion - 6

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 25. **QUESTION:**
As you may know, President (Bill) Clinton announced he is doubling the number of U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia, in order to protect American troops already there and complete the mission by March 31st (1994). Do you support or oppose sending additional troops to Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Support - 55%
Oppose - 42
No opinion - 3

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP

ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 26. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way he (President Bill Clinton) is handling... the situation in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve - 32%
Disapprove - 59
No opinion - 9

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP

ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 27. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President Bill Clinton) is handling the situation in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve - 34%
Disapprove - 62
No opinion - 4

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 505

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY NOTES: The poll was conducted after the evening news programs in every time zone.

BEGINNING DATE: October 12, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 12, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 28. **QUESTION:** Do you think the United States did the right thing to send U.S. troops to Somalia last December (1992) to try and make sure shipments of food got through to the people there, or should the U.S. troops have stayed out? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Right thing	- 67%
Stayed out	- 30
Don't know/No answer	- 3

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 893

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 18, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 19, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 29. **QUESTION:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? Mission approval

RESULTS:

Approve	- 29%
Disapprove	- 58
Don't know/No answer	- 13

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 893

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 18, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 19, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 30. **QUESTION:**
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President) Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? (If 'Depends' probe once with:) Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?

Mission approval

RESULTS:
Approve - 33%
Disapprove - 54
Don't know/Refused - 13

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,200

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Times Mirror

BEGINNING DATE: October 21, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 24, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: INTERNATIONAL POLICY OPINION SURVEY

Poll 31. **QUESTION:**
Do you approve or disapprove of the way (President Bill) Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?

Mission approval

RESULTS:
Approve - 35%
Disapprove - 57
No opinion - 8

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS, WASHINGTON POST

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,218

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: November 11, 1993

ENDING DATE: November 14, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS, WASHINGTON POST

Poll 32. **QUESTION:**
Do you think the United States did the right thing to send U.S. troops to Somalia last December to try and make sure shipments of food got through to the people there, or should the U.S. troops have stayed out?

Mission approval

RESULTS:

Did the right thing	- 62%
Should have stayed out	- 33
Don't know/No answer	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,289

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 5, 1993

ENDING DATE: December 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 33. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
What should be the U.S. (United States) goal in Somalia?

RESULTS:

Assuring delivery of relief supplies only	- 47%
Assuring delivery of relief supplies, then helping to restore peace and a working government	- 46
Don't know/Refused	- 7

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP

ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 602

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Newsweek

BEGINNING DATE: December 3, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 4, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP, NEWSWEEK

Poll 34. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
Regarding the situation in Somalia, how confident are you that each of the following will happen? Are you very confident, somewhat confident, not too confident, or not at all confident that... the U.S. (United States) will be able to accomplish its goals with very few or no American casualties?

RESULTS:

Very	- 27%
Somewhat	- 37
Not too	- 22
Not at all	- 10
No opinion	- 4

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP
ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,005

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 4, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 35. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
Do you think the role of U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia should be limited to delivering relief supplies there, or should they also attempt to bring a permanent end to the fighting in Somalia?

RESULTS:

Limited role	- 59%
Also attempt to end the fighting	- 31
Neither (vol.)	- 3
Other (vol.)	- 2
No opinion	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP
ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,005

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 4, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 36. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
Do you think U.S. (United States) troops should stay in Somalia
only as long as it takes to set up supply lines to make sure
people don't starve, or do you think they should stay there as
long as it takes to make sure Somalia will remain peaceful?

RESULTS:

Set up supply lines	- 48%
Make sure Somalia remains peaceful	- 44
Shouldn't be there (vol.)	- 3
Don't know/No answer	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS,
NEW YORK TIMES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,333

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 7, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 9, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

Poll 37. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
What's your impression of the principal objective of American
forces in Somalia? Is it to disarm the gangs of Somali gunmen
and end the civil war, or is it to restore enough order so that
famine relief can take place?

RESULTS:

Disarm gunmen	- 10%
Restore enough order	- 81
Not sure	- 9

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PRINCETON
SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,216

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Times Mirror

BEGINNING DATE: January 3, 1993

ENDING DATE: January 6, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: TIMES MIRROR NEWS
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Poll 38. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
Do you think U.S. (United States) troops should stay in Somalia only as long as it takes to set up supply lines to make sure people don't starve, or do you think they should stay there as long as it takes to make sure Somalia will remain peaceful?

RESULTS:

Till supply lines set up	- 47%
Till peaceful	- 48
Don't know/No answer	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,179

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: January 12, 1993

ENDING DATE: January 14, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

Poll 39. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
(President Bill) Clinton will have to make decisions about some foreign policy issues when he takes office. Which of the following comes closest to your own view about the decisions he should make?

RESULTS:

The U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia should stay until the groups that are fighting there are disarmed	- 51%
The U.S. should leave Somalia as soon as food suppliers are distributed throughout the country	- 44
Don't know/Refused	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,005

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: U.S. News and World Report

BEGINNING DATE: January 12, 1993

ENDING DATE: January 13, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: P.S.R.A., U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT

Poll 40. **QUESTION:** Mission goals

Do you think the U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia should be responsible for disarming the rival warlords there, or should the U.S. troops only be responsible for making sure that food is delivered to areas affected by the famine?

RESULTS:

Disarming the warlords	- 41%
Delivering food	- 52
Not sure	- 7

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,000

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network

BEGINNING DATE: January 13, 1993

ENDING DATE: January 14, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: TIME, C.N.N., YANKELOVICH PARTNERS

Poll 41. **QUESTION:** Mission goals

(Please tell me if you support or oppose the following policies in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq.)... Having U.S. (United States) troops disarm the warring factions in Somalia

RESULTS:

Support	- 71%
Oppose	- 24
Not sure	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,255

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: January 22, 1993

ENDING DATE: January 26, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: HARRIS POLL

Poll 42. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
(Please tell me if you support or oppose the following policies in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq.)... Keeping the U.S. (United States) troops in Somalia until they can hand over to a reasonably stable government

RESULTS:

Support - 77%
Oppose - 20
Not sure - 3

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,255

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: January 22, 1993

ENDING DATE: January 26, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: HARRIS POLL

Poll 43. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
Mohammed Farah Aidid is the leader of a Somali clan whose troops killed United Nations peacekeepers. U.N. troops are trying to capture him. Do you think this is a good idea because it shows that violence against U.N. peacekeepers will not be tolerated, or do you think this is a bad idea because this gets the U.N. involved in Somalia's civil war?

RESULTS:

Good idea - 66%
Bad idea - 23
Don't know/No answer - 11

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,363

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY NOTES: 622 respondents were reinterviewed on 6/27/93 after the missile attack on Baghdad, Iraq (June 26, 1993). Those results are shown separately.

BEGINNING DATE: June 21, 1993

ENDING DATE: June 24, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

Poll 44. **QUESTION:** When United Nations peace-keepers are killed in Somalia, should United States troops retaliate, or is that likely to get the United States bogged down in Somalia? Mission goals

RESULTS:

Should retaliate	- 41%
Likely to get bogged down	- 42
Don't know/No answer	- 17

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,363

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY NOTES: 622 respondents were reinterviewed on 6/27/93 after the missile attack on Baghdad, Iraq (June 26, 1993). Those results are shown separately.

BEGINNING DATE: June 21, 1993

ENDING DATE: June 24, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

Poll 45. **QUESTION:** Do you think U.S. (United States) troops should leave Somalia altogether, or should they stay in a limited capacity to preserve peace? Mission goals

RESULTS:

Leave altogether	- 53%
Stay in a limited capacity	- 46
Don't know/Refused	- 1

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP

ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,002

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Cable News Network, U.S.A. Today

QUESTION NOTES: Asked of those who said U.S. should stop active military involvement (57%)

BEGINNING DATE: September 10, 1993

ENDING DATE: September 12, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP, C.N.N., U.S.A. TODAY

Poll 46. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
Do you think the United States should keep troops in Somalia until there's a functioning civil government there that can run things, or do you think the U.S. should pull its troops out of Somalia very soon, even if there is no functioning civil government in place there?

RESULTS:

Keep troops in Somalia	- 28%
Pull troops out of Somalia	- 64
No opinion	- 8

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the evening news programs aired in each time zone.

BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 47. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
Three is now a proposal to immediately send several thousand additional U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia, with two missions: to try to free the U.S. servicemen now being held hostage, and to establish order in Somalia. Would you favor or oppose this proposal?

RESULTS:

Favor	- 61%
Oppose	- 26
Not sure	- 13

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: NBC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 806

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: NBC NEWS

Poll 48. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.)
(In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following should be the most important goals of the United States and which should not?)... Establishing a stable government in Somalia.

RESULTS:

Should be	- 43%
Should not be	- 52
Not sure	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: TIME, C.N.N., YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

Poll 49. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.)
(In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following should be the most important goals of the United States and which should not?)... Ending starvation in Somalia.

RESULTS:

Should be - 61%
Should not be - 33
Not sure - 6

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: TIME, C.N.N., YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

Poll 50. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.)
(In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following should be the most important goals of the United States and which should not?)... Capturing the Somali warlord responsible for the attack on the U.S. troops.

RESULTS:

Should be - 63%
Should not be - 32
Not sure - 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: TIME, C.N.N., YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

Poll 51. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.)
(In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following should be the most important goals of the United States and which should not?)... Bringing U.S. troops home as soon as possible.

RESULTS:

Should be	- 89%
Should not be	- 10
Not sure	- 1

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: TIME, C.N.N., YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

Poll 52. **QUESTION:** Mission goals
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.)
In making decisions about Somalia, which of the following should be the most important goals of the United States and which should not?... Making sure that the U.S. soldiers taken prisoner in Somalia are safely released.

RESULTS:

Should be - 96%
Should not be - 3
Not sure - 1

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: TIME, C.N.N., YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

Poll 53. **QUESTION:**
What if removing U.S. (United States) troops from Somalia could lead to a breakdown in food distribution and another famine there--should the U.S. troops be pulled out, or not?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:

Yes	- 79%
No	- 16
No opinion	- 6

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

QUESTION NOTES: Asked of those who said U.S. troops should be removed very soon even if there is no functioning civil government (64%)

SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the evening news programs aired in each time zone.

BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 54. **QUESTION:** How soon do you think U.S. (United States) troops should be removed from Somalia--immediately, before the end of the year, or what? Pullout conditions

RESULTS:

Immediately	- 58%
Before the end of the year	- 38
Longer than year's end (into 1994)	- 2
No opinion	- 2

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 509

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

QUESTION NOTES: Asked of those who said U.S. troops should be removed very soon even if there is no functioning civil government (64%)

SURVEY NOTES: The interviewing was done after the evening news programs aired in each time zone.

BEGINNING DATE: October 5, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 5, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 55. **QUESTION:** What should the United States do now? Do you think the United States should keep its troops in Somalia until the situation in Somalia is peaceful, or should the United States withdraw its troops quickly? Pullout conditions

RESULTS:

Keep its troops in Somalia	- 32%
Withdraw	- 60
Don't know/No answer	- 9

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 56. **QUESTION:**
One of the objectives of the mission has been to capture the Somali clan leader Mahammed Farah Aideed. What do you think is more important--to capture Mahammed Farah Aideed before withdrawing U.S. (United States) troops from Somalia, or withdrawing U.S. troops from Somalia as soon as possible, even if Aideed is not captured?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:
Capture Aideed before withdrawing - 34%
Withdraw regardless - 56
Don't know/No answer - 11

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 57. **QUESTION:**
Do you favor or oppose the United States withdrawing all of its troops from Somalia?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:
Favor - 64%
Oppose - 29
Not sure - 7

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: NBC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 806

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: NBC NEWS

Poll 58. **QUESTION:** Which of these three options do you most favor for U.S. (United States) policy in Somalia--withdraw all U.S. troops immediately: withdraw troops, but only after all captured U.S. servicemen are returned: or stay in Somalia until political stability is restored? Pullout conditions

RESULTS:

Withdraw all troops	- 11%
Withdraw troops after servicemen returned	- 67
Remain until stability is restored	- 19
Not sure	- 3

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: NBC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 806

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: NBC NEWS

Poll 59. **QUESTION:** What do you think is more important--to make sure that all Americans captured by the Somalis are safely accounted for before withdrawing U.S. (United States) troops from Somalia, or withdrawing U.S. troops from Somalia as soon as possible, even if not all captured Americans are safely accounted for? Pullout conditions

RESULTS:

Safely accounted for before withdrawing	- 74%
Withdraw regardless	- 19
Don't know/No answer	- 7

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 530

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 6, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 60. **QUESTION:**
What do you think is more important--to make sure that all Americans captured by the Somalis are safely accounted for before withdrawing U.S. (United States) troops from Somalia, or withdrawing U.S. troops from Somalia as soon as possible, even if not all captured Americans are safely accounted for?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:
Safely accounted for before withdrawing - 73%
Withdraw regardless - 20
Don't know/No answer - 7

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS
POPULATION: National adult
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone
BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993
SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 61. **QUESTION:**
What would be your preference--to have all U.S. (United States) troops withdrawn from Somalia immediately, by March 31, (1994), or sometime after March 31?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:
Immediately - 50%
March 31 - 33
Some time after March 31 - 9
Not at all (vol.) - 3
No opinion - 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS
POPULATION: National adult
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506
INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone
BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993
ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993
SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 62. **QUESTION:**
If at the time of the withdrawal date there's a risk that withdrawing U.S. (United States) troops could lead to a breakdown in food distribution and another famine in Somalia, should the United States withdraw its troops anyway, or not?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:
Yes, should withdraw - 64%
No, should not withdraw - 32
No opinion - 4

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 63. **QUESTION:**
If at the time of the withdrawal date there is still no stable government in place to run things in Somalia, should the United States withdraw its troops anyway, or not?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:
Yes, should withdraw troops - 77%
No, should not withdraw troops - 20
No opinion - 3

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: ABC NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 506

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: ABC NEWS

Poll 64. **QUESTION:** In your view, what should the United States do now in Somalia-
-One: Withdraw all U.S. troops now, Two: Withdraw U.S. troops over the next six months, or Three: Keep troops in Somalia until our humanitarian mission has been accomplished?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:

Withdraw now	- 37%
Withdraw in six months	- 27
Keep troops in Somalia	- 31
No opinion	- 5

**ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP
ORGANIZATION**

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 65. **QUESTION:** In your view, should the U.S. (United States) keep its troops in Somalia as long as it takes until:... all American prisoners have been recovered?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:

Keep troops	- 76%
Don't keep	- 20
No opinion	- 4

**ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP
ORGANIZATION**

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 66. **QUESTION:**
In your view, should the U.S. (United States) keep its troops in Somalia as long as it takes until:... the Somalia warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid, is captured and punished?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:

Keep troops - 33%
Don't keep - 60
No opinion - 7

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP

ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 67. **QUESTION:**
In your view, should the U.S. (United States) keep its troops in Somalia as long as it takes until:... order has been restored in Somalia?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:

Keep troops - 32%
Don't keep - 64
No opinion - 4

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: GALLUP

ORGANIZATION

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,019

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 8, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 10, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: GALLUP POLL

Poll 68. **QUESTION:**
Overall now, please tell me which of the following positions is the closest to your position about what the U.S. (United States) should do in Somalia?..Withdraw immediately, withdraw in 6 months, withdraw when we have stabilized the country, even if this takes longer than six months.

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:

Withdraw immediately	- 28%
Withdraw in 6 months	- 43
Withdraw when we have stabilized the country, even if this takes longer than six months	- 27
Don't know/Refused	- 2

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: PROGRAM
ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES U.

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 803

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY NOTES: Interviewing was conducted by National
Research Inc.

BEGINNING DATE: October 15, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 18, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA

Poll 69. **QUESTION:**
What should the United States do now? Do you think the United States should keep its troops in Somalia until the situation in Somalia is peaceful, or should the United States withdraw its troops as quickly as possible?

Pullout
conditions

RESULTS:

Keep its troops in Somalia	- 33%
Withdraw	- 60
Don't know/No answer	- 7

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 893

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 18, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 19, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 70. **QUESTION:** Worth it

Given the possible loss of American lives and the other costs involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops to make sure food gets to the people of Somalia is worth the cost, or not?

RESULTS:

Worth the cost	- 66%
Not worth the cost	- 20
Don't know/No answer	- 14

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 835

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 6, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 6, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 71. **QUESTION:** Worth it

Given the possible loss of American lives, the financial costs, and other risks involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops to make sure food gets through to the people of Somalia is worth the cost, or not?

RESULTS:

Worth it	- 70%
Not worth it	- 21
Don't know/No answer	- 9

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS,
NEW YORK TIMES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,333

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 7, 1992

ENDING DATE: December 9, 1992

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

Poll 72. **QUESTION:** Worth it
Given the possible loss of American lives and other costs involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops to make sure food gets through to the people of Somalia is worth the cost, or not?

RESULTS:

Worth it	- 69%
Not worth it	- 26
Don't know/No answer	- 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,179

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: January 12, 1993

ENDING DATE: January 14, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS, NEW YORK TIMES

Poll 73. **QUESTION:** Worth it
Given the loss of American life, the financial costs, and other risks involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia to make sure food got through to the people of Somalia was worth the cost, or not?

RESULTS:

Worth the cost	- 45%
Not worth the cost	- 45
Don't know/No answer	- 10

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,117

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 6, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 74. **QUESTION:** Worth it
(Here are a few questions concerning the recent events in Somalia, in which U.S. (United States) soldiers have been killed or taken prisoner by forces controlled by a Somalian warlord.)
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:...
Nothing the U.S. could accomplish in Somalia is worth the death of even one more U.S. soldier.

RESULTS:

Agree - 60%
Disagree - 35
Not sure - 5

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY:

YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 500

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

SURVEY SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network

BEGINNING DATE: October 7, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: TIME, C.N.N., YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC.

Poll 75. **QUESTION:** Worth it
Given the loss of American life, the financial costs, and other risks involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia to make sure food got through to the people of Somalia was worth the cost, or not?

RESULTS:

Worth the cost - 42%
Not worth the cost - 44
Don't know/No answer - 14

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 893

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: October 18, 1993

ENDING DATE: October 19, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

Poll 76. **QUESTION:** Worth it

Given the loss of American life, the financial costs, and other risks involved, do you think sending U.S. (United States) troops to Somalia to make sure food got through to the people of Somalia was worth the cost, or not?

RESULTS:

Worth the cost	- 48%
Not worth the cost	- 44
Don't know/No answer	- 8

ORGANIZATION CONDUCTING SURVEY: CBS NEWS

POPULATION: National adult

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 1,289

INTERVIEW METHOD: Telephone

BEGINNING DATE: December 5, 1993

ENDING DATE: December 7, 1993

SOURCE DOCUMENT: CBS NEWS

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